Adeyinka Omisora v Central Investigative Court No 5 Madrid

Under Extradition Act 2003, a Part 1 warrant need not provide highly detailed particulars. Substantial compliance is sufficient if, read as a whole and with admissible further information, it enables the requested person to understand with reasonable certainty what conduct is alleged, and when and where it occurred. Deficiencies which are gaps may be cured by further information; a wholesale failure to provide the statutory information requires discharge.

For the forum bar, the appellate court may interfere with the district judge’s evaluative judgment only for an error of law, failure to consider a specified matter, consideration of an irrelevant matter, or an irrational or unreasonable conclusion. A challenge merely to the weight given to individual factors is insufficient.

The appellant challenged the decision of District Judge Griffiths, given on 5 January 2023, ordering his extradition to Spain to face allegations of participation in a criminal organisation, fraud and money laundering arising from a cyber-fraud conspiracy.

Permission to appeal was granted on three grounds: whether the warrant supplied adequate particulars of the alleged conduct under section 2(4)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003; whether it supplied adequate particulars of sentence under section 2(4)(d); and whether extradition was barred by forum. The central issues were whether defects in the warrant amounted to a wholesale failure or curable gaps, and whether the district judge’s forum assessment disclosed an appellate error.

1. Appeal dismissed. The warrant, read together with the three sets of further information, substantially complied with section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. The warrant did not need to resemble an indictment or civil pleading. It had to enable the appellant to understand with reasonable certainty the substance of the allegations, including what he was said to have done, and when and where. The warrant sufficiently identified the appellant’s alleged role as the person responsible for contacting Taiwo and directing transfers to clearing accounts. The unexplained reference to “SPONK” was a lacuna capable of being clarified by further information, not a wholesale failure.
3. The absence of a precise end date did not invalidate the warrant. In a large, multi-jurisdictional conspiracy, the inability to identify the precise cessation date may reflect the nature of the investigation. Further information clarified that the organisation had been dismantled by May 2016. The remaining gaps did not prevent compliance with section 2.
4. The reference to a maximum sentence of six years was unequivocal. Stating lower maximum sentences for the individual offences did not create an inconsistency or require an explanation of Spanish sentencing practice. Ground 2 therefore failed.
5. The first limb of section 19B(2) was accepted. The specified interests-of-justice factors nevertheless favoured prosecution in Spain. Harm had occurred there through the unwanted use of Spanish bridging accounts and the resulting concern and risk to account holders. The victims’ interests, the number of related prosecutions already conducted in Spain, and consistency of approach supported extradition. The availability of evidence in the United Kingdom was considered but did not outweigh those factors.
6. Considering the effect of removal on the appellant’s United Kingdom connections was not an error. The forum assessment was evaluative. The court could interfere only for legal or statutory error, failure to consider a specified matter, consideration of an irrelevant matter, or an irrational or unreasonable overall judgment. A disagreement about the weight of individual factors was insufficient.

1. District Judge Griffiths: on 5 January 2023, rejected the appellant’s objections and ordered extradition to Spain.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): permission was granted by Swift J on 1 August 2023 on three grounds. The appeal was dismissed.