Solicitors Regulation Authority Limited v Soophia Khan & Ors.

Finality is a strong factor against reopening a final contempt judgment. It may be displaced where compelling new evidence creates a real risk of injustice, particularly where imprisonment may follow and the defendant may be a protected party. Until protected-party status is determined, CPR Part 21 may prevent further steps or sanction. In sentencing for civil contempt, the court assesses culpability and harm, considers cooperation and remorse, and may impose custody where a fine is insufficient. The sentence may include an element designed to secure future compliance. Civil contempt sentencing is fact-specific and does not require a uniform starting-point-and-discount method.

The Solicitors Regulation Authority sought sanctions against Soophia Khan and related respondents after the court had found them liable for contempt in the Liability Judgment, [2023] EWHC 302 (Ch). Before sanction, Ms Khan relied on medical evidence to seek reopening of the liability judgment, an adjournment pending appointment of a litigation friend, or an adjournment for further expert evidence concerning whether she was a protected party. The court also considered the appropriate sanction for breaches of the Miles Order, including failures to deliver up files and records.

The central issues were whether the liability judgment should be reopened or sanction adjourned because of possible lack of capacity, and what custodial sentence was necessary and proportionate for the established contempt.

1. Status application. The applications to reopen the Liability Judgment and to adjourn sanction were dismissed. The finality principle weighed heavily against reopening a final liability judgment, particularly where the claimant exercised public regulatory functions, the court had given repeated opportunities to present evidence, and committal proceedings should be determined promptly. The medical evidence was given little weight and did not establish a real prospect that Ms Khan was a protected party.
2. If the evidence had carried significant weight, the court would have been prepared to reopen the judgment. A real risk of imprisonment for a person who might lack capacity would be a powerful counterweight to finality. Further, under CPR Part 21, the claimant could not take a further step, and the court could not proceed to sanction, until any protected-party issue had been determined and, if necessary, a litigation friend appointed.
3. Sanction. Applying the Crystal Mews criteria, the court assessed prejudice, pressure, deliberateness, culpability, third-party responsibility, seriousness, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility, apology, remorse or reasonable excuse. The breaches were deliberate and serious, caused continuing prejudice to clients, involved defiance of the regulator and misleading evidence, and attracted no meaningful discount for cooperation or admissions.
4. The court imposed concurrent sentences of 18 months for breaches of paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Miles Order, together with 12 months for past breaches and six months to secure future compliance. After a 33% discount for accepted medical and personal circumstances, the effective sentence was 12 months’ imprisonment. The sentence was not suspended. The respondents remained liable for contempt, and Ms Khan was entitled to appeal as of right.

The judgment describes the prior Liability Judgment and earlier contempt proceedings. It does not state a subsequent appellate disposition of this sanction judgment.