Andrew Riddell Dunlop v Rostislav Rostislavavitch Romanoff

Where a conveyance states that land is more particularly delineated on a plan, a clear plan will normally prevail over an unclear verbal description. That is not an absolute rule. Where clear words and a clear plan conflict, the conveyance must be construed as a whole and in its admissible factual context.

Extrinsic evidence may show that the case falls outside the normal priority of the plan. A related completed deed is objective evidence of the transactions made and may assist construction; it is not excluded merely because it reveals what parties had previously agreed. If the evidence establishes both a clear drafting mistake and the sole correction required, corrective interpretation may cure the mistake without rectification.

The appellant applied for first registration of part of a lane adjoining Lunsford Farm. The respondent objected. The First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) directed cancellation of the application, holding that a 1918 conveyance did not include the lane because its clear plan, on which the land was stated to be more particularly delineated, excluded it.

The conveyance schedule listed the whole of an Ordnance Survey parcel, including its precise total acreage, although the plan included only part of that parcel. Earlier and later conveyances indicated that the appellant's predecessor had contracted for, and later dealt with, the lane as owner. The appeal concerned whether the 1918 conveyance, properly construed, conveyed the lane.

1. Appeal allowed. The First-tier Tribunal erred by treating a clear plan as necessarily decisive. A plan which more particularly delineates the land will generally or normally prevail where the words are unclear, or where clear words conflict with it. The word “normally” is material: the rule admits exceptions.

2. The 1918 conveyance contained a real internal inconsistency. Its plan clearly excluded the application land, but its schedule clearly identified the whole of plot 210 and gave its full acreage. The qualifications “or thereabouts” and “Approximate Acreage” allowed for insignificant measuring differences; they did not make it plausible that nearly 40% of that particular plot had been omitted. The conveyance had to be read as a whole, and the schedule was not subordinate merely because it appeared there.

3. Admissible extrinsic evidence strongly supported the schedule. The conveyance of Westcott was objective evidence that the predecessor had contracted to purchase Lunsford Farm including the lane, and that the parties had not changed that position when it was completed. The later conveyances were consistent only with his ownership of the lane. That evidence, together with business common sense, displaced the normal priority of the plan. The 1918 conveyance therefore included the application land.

4. Independently, the Tribunal held that corrective interpretation was available. The evidence demonstrated that excluding the lane from the colouring on the plan was a mistake, and that the only possible correction was to treat the plan as including it. The First-tier Tribunal had wrongly speculated that the vendor might have retained the lane despite contractual obligations to convey it.

5. The Chief Land Registrar was directed to give effect to the appellant’s registration application as if the respondent’s objection had not been made.

• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): Allowed the appeal in [2023] UKUT 200 (LC) and directed the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to the application.
• First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): Directed the registrar to cancel the application for first registration following the respondent’s objection.