Stephen Peter Hurley v Head of the Transport Regulation Unit

An appellate tribunal reviewing an operator-licensing decision must decide whether the appellant has shown that the decision was plainly wrong. A refusal for lack of good repute may properly rest on a serious and recent attempt to mislead the regulator, even where the applicant satisfies financial-standing requirements and there are no concerns about driving standards or the proposed transport manager.

However, a period before which repute may be regained must be supported by coherent reasoning, take account only of relevant matters, and be proportionate. It is impermissible to describe the assessment as non-mathematical while fixing the period by reference to conviction-rehabilitation dates without adequate justification.

The appellant applied for a standard international goods-vehicle operator’s licence. The Head of the Transport Regulation Unit refused it after a public inquiry, finding that the appellant lacked good repute because of his role in a dishonest application made in his partner’s name and his later denial of their connection.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the refusal and the indication that good repute could not be demonstrated before October 2023. He relied on delay in dealing with an earlier application, the absence of road-safety concerns, his evidence of compliance arrangements, and the asserted disproportionality and inadequate reasons for the rehabilitation period.

The central questions were whether the refusal was plainly wrong or disproportionate, and whether the period before a further application could succeed had been lawfully and proportionately fixed.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The Tribunal confirmed the refusal of the licence application but set aside and substituted the part of the decision fixing the earliest date at which good repute could be re-established.

2. Applying the appellate approach stated in Fergal Hughes v DOENI & Perry McKee Homes Ltd v DOENI, [2013] UKUT 618 AAC, the appellant bore the burden of showing that the reasoning and application of the law required a different view. The refusal itself was not plainly wrong.

3. The Presiding Officer was entitled to treat the appellant’s involvement in an application made as a front, and the subsequent denial of his connection with the applicant, as a serious attempt to undermine the regulatory system. There was no need to investigate the motivation for that dishonesty. The delay in determining the earlier application was significant, but did not make the ultimate refusal unreasonable. The Presiding Officer had also weighed the favourable matters, including financial standing, the proposed transport manager, and the absence of criticism of the appellant as a driver.

4. The later period of deemed lost repute was plainly wrong. The reasons were disjointed: the Presiding Officer said that rehabilitation was not a mathematical exercise but calculated the period by reference to dates when convictions became spent. The reasoning also introduced an extraneous concern about the appellant’s ability to handle authority and did not properly balance favourable factors. The resulting period was disproportionate.

5. The Tribunal substituted March 2023 for October 2023. It held that the earliest date on which the Department might legitimately find repute re-established was the last day of March 2023. If a standard international licence were later granted, an independent audit after six months and a report to the Head of the TRU would be appropriate additional undertaking.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): allowed the appeal in part, confirmed the refusal for lack of good repute, and substituted a shorter period before repute could be re-established.
• Head of the Transport Regulation Unit: on 10 March 2022 refused the application for a standard international goods-vehicle operator’s licence on the ground that the applicant lacked good repute.