Philip Drake

On an appeal against revocation of a restricted goods vehicle operator’s licence, the Upper Tribunal must determine matters of law and fact on the material before the Traffic Commissioner. It must not conduct a rehearing. The appellant bears the burden of showing that the decision was wrong; on factual and discretionary matters, the decision must be shown to be plainly wrong.

For a restricted licence, the Traffic Commissioner may exercise the discretion under section 13D of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 to assess whether insufficient financial resources would prejudice vehicle maintenance. Once that discretion is exercised, applying the standard-licence financial formula is permissible. Later-produced financial evidence cannot impugn the original decision.

The appellant, a sole-trader builder, held a restricted goods vehicle operator’s licence for one vehicle. When renewal was sought, he failed to provide the financial information requested by the Office of the Traffic Commissioner. The Traffic Commissioner revoked the licence under section 26(1)(h) of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995, concluding that there had been a material change in circumstances because sufficient financial resources might no longer be available.

The appellant challenged the revocation, relying on his ability to maintain the vehicle, disputed receipt of correspondence, and later supplied building-society statements. The central issues were the proper appellate approach, whether the section 13D financial-resources test had been lawfully invoked and applied, and whether the later evidence affected the decision.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Upper Tribunal extended time for bringing the appeal, but was not persuaded that the revocation decision contained an error of law or was plainly wrong.
2. Under paragraph 17 of Schedule 4 to the Transport Act 1985, the Upper Tribunal has full jurisdiction to determine matters of law and fact. However, as explained in Bradley Fold Travel Ltd & Anor v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 695, it does not rehear the evidence as a new first-instance tribunal. The appellant must show that the reasoning and application of the law require a different outcome, or, in relation to fact and discretion, that the Traffic Commissioner was plainly wrong. Paragraph 17(3) also prevents consideration of circumstances arising after the appealed determination.
3. Section 13A of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 expressly concerns standard licences. Section 13D applies to restricted licences, but only if the Traffic Commissioner thinks fit to apply it. The references to financial resources in the correspondence and revocation decision permitted the inference that this discretion had been exercised, although the decision could have explained the point more clearly.
4. It was not plainly wrong for the Traffic Commissioner, having applied section 13D, to use the formula applicable to standard licences when assessing whether vehicle-maintenance arrangements would be prejudiced by insufficient resources. The later statements were not before the Traffic Commissioner and, in any event, did not show an average available balance of £3,100 over three months.
5. The correspondence was properly sent to the address supplied for licensing communications. The appellant therefore derived no assistance from his alleged non-receipt. The Upper Tribunal noted shortcomings in the explanation of the decision, but they did not invalidate it.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): appeal against the Traffic Commissioner’s decision of 2 September 2022 dismissed.