Case details
Summary
Under rule 39 of the ET Rules, a tribunal may make a deposit order where an allegation has little reasonable prospect of success. It conducts a high-level overall assessment and need not address every item of evidence or submission. A deposit order may encompass an asserted injury to feelings, as well as liability issues.
A tribunal may take account of a claimant’s previous similar unsuccessful claims when assessing whether the claimant was genuinely interested in an advertised role. Reasons are sufficiently provided with a deposit order where the order and the accompanying judgment are supplied together. An arguable occupational-requirement issue does not invalidate a deposit order founded independently on the claimant’s lack of genuine interest in the job.
Factual background
The appellant found an online advertisement for a female finance and administrative worker issued by a charity providing refuge and related services. He did not apply for the role but brought a sex-discrimination claim.
Employment Tribunal: Employment Judge Welch refused to strike out the claim, but ordered the appellant to pay a deposit. The judge held that the claim had little reasonable prospect of success, principally because it was unlikely that the appellant could establish a genuine interest in the role. The judge also refused a deposit order against the respondents and later refused reconsideration.
Employment Appeal Tribunal: The appellant challenged those three decisions under rule 3(10) of the EAT Rules 1993. The central issue was whether the tribunal had erred in making the deposit order or in refusing the related applications.
Held
The Rule 3(10) applications were dismissed. None of the three appeals disclosed reasonable grounds. They were also certified as totally without merit.
Employment Judge Welch correctly applied rule 39 of the ET Rules. The question was whether a specified allegation or argument had little reasonable prospect of success. This required a high-level overall assessment, not a full trial or a response to every factual assertion advanced by the appellant. The reasons adequately supported the conclusion that the claim had little reasonable prospect of success.
The tribunal was entitled to assess whether the appellant was genuinely interested in the advertised job. His failure to seek further information or apply, the role’s location and nature, and his prior similar claims were relevant to that assessment. The prior claims could properly be considered when evaluating the likelihood that he genuinely sought the post.
The tribunal was also entitled to consider the pleaded assertion of injury to feelings. Although injury to feelings is ordinarily remedial, the asserted injury was an allegation in the claim and was therefore capable of being considered for the purpose of a rule 39 deposit order.
Rule 39 required the tribunal’s reasons to be provided with the order. It did not require the reasons to appear in the same document. The deposit order and judgment had been supplied together, and the tribunal’s procedure was unobjectionable.
The possible occupational requirement under paragraph 1 of Schedule 9 to the Equality Act 2010 required careful consideration and full evidence. Even so, any issue with that aspect of the tribunal’s reasoning could not affect the result. The independently sufficient basis for the deposit order was the appellant’s little prospect of proving genuine interest in the role.
There was no arguable error in refusing a deposit order against the respondents or in refusing reconsideration.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
Employment Appeal Tribunal: Rule 3(10) applications dismissed in [2024] EAT 67; all three appeals were held to be totally without merit.
Employment Tribunal: Employment Judge Welch refused strike-out, made a deposit order against the claimant, refused a deposit order against the respondents, and refused reconsideration. No citation was stated.
Key cases cited
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