London Borough of Islington, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Education

In a judicial review of a decision about a failing school’s Academy viability, rationality turns on whether the decision-maker had sufficient legally relevant information to make an informed assessment and omitted no vital matter. The decision-maker need not receive every internal projection, exact deficit figure or current pupil count where the salient facts, proposed strategy, sponsor’s credentials and opposing case are available.

The Academies Act 2010 policy framework makes revocation exceptional. The Tameside duty does not require inquiries into unknowable future SEN placements or funding. It may be reasonable to rely on statutory duties, demand and broad assumptions. This was a fact-specific case; permission to appeal was refused.

The London Borough of Islington challenged the Secretary of State for Education’s refusal to revoke an Academy Order concerning Pooles Park Primary School. The school had been rated inadequate, and the Secretary of State had selected an experienced academy trust as sponsor.

Choudhury J dismissed the judicial review claim: [2024] EWHC 1798 (Admin). The Council sought permission to appeal on rationality and Tameside grounds, arguing that the Minister lacked essential financial and pupil information and failed to make further inquiries about SEN placements and funding. The central issues were whether the Minister had sufficient legally relevant material and whether any further inquiries were legally required.

Application refused. Lady Justice Andrews gave the reasons for joining Lady Justice Macur in refusing permission to appeal. Neither proposed ground had a real prospect of success, and there was no other compelling reason to entertain an appeal.

1. Rationality and relevant information. The challenge was properly analysed as asking whether the Minister had all the information that it was legally relevant for her to know in order to make an informed decision. A decision may be irrational if the decision-maker lacks sufficient information for an informed assessment or leaves a vital matter out of account. This was distinct from disagreement with the substantive judgment. The Judge had applied the principles in R (National Association of Health Stores & Anr) v Department of Health [2005] EWCA Civ 154 correctly.
2. Extent of information required. The Minister had sufficient factual information about falling pupil numbers, surplus places, SEN demand, the proposed SEN strategy, shared resources, the Trust’s credentials and the Council’s objections. She did not need the Trust’s detailed internal modelling, precise deficit or surplus figures, or the latest pupil numbers. She was entitled to rely on a summary of the salient facts underpinning the officials’ assessment, while making the decision herself.
3. Viability and exceptional revocation. Under the published policy governing the discretionary power in section 5D of the Academies Act 2010, revocation was confined to exceptional circumstances. In this case the relevant question was whether there was no realistic prospect that the school could become financially viable in the medium to long term with the assistance of the selected sponsor. That was a high hurdle where the sponsor had a proven record of improving an inadequate school and substantial relevant experience.
4. Tameside duty. The duty to make reasonable inquiries did not require further inquiries into the number of future SEN placements or the amount of associated funding. Those matters depended on imponderables, including parental preference, individual needs and future placement decisions. It was reasonable to assume that a local authority would act in accordance with its statutory duties and provide associated funding where the statutory placement criteria were met.
5. Disposition. The challenge was fact-specific and raised no wider issue of principle or practice. Continuing uncertainty was contrary to the interests of the school’s pupils, parents and staff. Permission to appeal was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal was refused because neither proposed ground had a real prospect of success and there was no compelling reason for an appeal.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Choudhury J dismissed the Council’s judicial review claim: [2024] EWHC 1798 (Admin).