London Borough of Islington, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Education

The discretion to revoke an Academy Order must be exercised lawfully, but the statutory default is that an inadequately rated maintained school should proceed towards academisation. In deciding whether a school is viable as an academy, the Secretary of State may consider the prospective sponsor’s expertise, resources, proposed operating model and assessment of future demand, including demand for special educational needs provision. A minister may rely on a departmental submission summarising salient facts and need not receive every underlying financial calculation. The court reviews legality, not its own view of projected educational or financial outcomes. Falling rolls, surplus places and an inadequate Ofsted rating do not, without more, establish exceptional circumstances requiring revocation.

The claimant local authority sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to revoke an Academy Order made after Ofsted rated Pooles Park Primary School inadequate and placed it in special measures. The Council wished to close the maintained school as part of its strategy for managing surplus places, falling pupil numbers and projected deficits. The Secretary of State considered that the proposed sponsor, The Bridge Multi-Academy Trust, offered a viable future through shared resources and additional special educational needs provision.

The Council alleged irrationality, inadequate inquiry under the Tameside duty, frustration of its statutory education-planning functions and unlawful fettering of discretion. The central issues were whether the school was viable as an academy, whether the Minister had sufficient legally relevant information, and whether the refusal unlawfully impeded the Council’s statutory objectives.

1. Claim dismissed. None of the five grounds for judicial review succeeded.
2. Viability had to be assessed as the school would operate after academisation, not merely on the basis of its pre-academy position. It was therefore lawful to give considerable weight to the proposed MAT’s expertise, financial resources, shared staffing model and assessment that additional SEN places could attract pupils. The court would not substitute its own view for that of decision-makers with relevant institutional expertise, particularly where the assessment involved predictions and finely balanced judgments.
3. The Minister was entitled to rely on the departmental Submission. It conveyed the salient facts, including falling numbers, surplus places, deficits, demand for SEN provision, the Trust’s proposal, its performance at Hungerford, and the Council’s objections. The detailed Modelling was indicative and did not contain information that was legally necessary for the Minister to know. The Secretary of State was not required to undertake her own detailed financial modelling. The inquiries made into the Trust’s proposal were sufficient to discharge the Tameside duty.
4. The refusal was not irrational in the wider circumstances. An inadequate rating was the reason for the Academy Order and academisation was intended to provide an opportunity for improvement. The School’s status as the only inadequate-rated primary school, and the need to rationalise places, did not themselves constitute exceptional circumstances requiring revocation.
5. The statutory-purpose challenge failed. The decision might make the Council’s education-planning functions more difficult and might require it to consider other options, but it did not utterly defeat its duties to secure efficient education or promote high standards. Nor was the discretion fettered. The Minister considered a range of factors, with viability receiving particular attention because it was the principal ground advanced for revocation. The claim was dismissed.