R v Abdulrahman Haddad

Failure to surrender to bail under section 6 of the Bail Act 1976 is a distinct criminal offence, not contempt of court. The words as if in section 6(5) govern punishment without converting the offence into contempt or a kindred offence. Ordinary sentencing provisions therefore apply. A suspended sentence of imprisonment below 14 days is unlawful under section 277(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020. On quashing an unlawful sentence, an appellate court may substitute an absolute discharge where the statutory minimum would be unjust in the unusual circumstances, taking account of relevant custody and the passage of time.

The appellant was tried at Wood Green Crown Court for assault offences and was acquitted by the jury. He was nevertheless convicted by the Recorder of failing without reasonable excuse to surrender to bail at the appointed time, contrary to section 6(2) of the Bail Act 1976. He received seven days’ imprisonment suspended for six months.

He appealed against conviction, arguing that the procedure was unfair and that he had a reasonable excuse. He also appealed against sentence. During the appeal, the respondent argued that the sentence was a contempt committal or a sentence for a kindred offence, and therefore fell outside the 14-day minimum for suspended imprisonment. The central issues were the fairness of the conviction proceedings, the legal character of a section 6 offence, and the lawful disposal of the sentence appeal.

Conviction appeal dismissed; sentence appeal allowed.

1. Procedure and representation. Legal representation in proceedings for a Bail Act offence is not absolute. Where an unrepresented defendant requires representation to explain the absence, the court must ensure representation or, at least, give the fullest possible opportunity to offer an excuse. Applying R v Davis (1986) 8 Cr App R (S) 64, the court held that the appellant had been given that opportunity. His explanation extended over about eleven transcript pages, and the procedure was fair.
2. Reasonable excuse. The burden was on the appellant to the civil standard. He knew that the trial could start at short notice during the two-week warned-list period, but failed to arrange his employment so that he remained available. The judge was entitled to find that there was no reasonable excuse for his late attendance.
3. Nature of the offence. An offence under section 6 of the Bail Act 1976 is a separate and unique criminal offence. It is not itself contempt of court. The direction in section 6(5) that it is punishable as if it were criminal contempt provides an alternative mode of punishment and does not convert the offence into contempt. That conclusion followed R v Harbax Singh [1979] QB 319, Schiavo v Anderton (1986) 83 Cr App R 228, R v Reader (1987) 84 Cr App R 294 and R v Lubega (1999) 163 JP 221.
4. Sentence and disposal. The judge intended to impose an ordinary suspended sentence for the Bail Act offence. It was not a contempt committal or sentence for a kindred offence. Section 277(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020 therefore applied, making the seven-day suspended sentence unlawful. The court quashed it. Although section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 did not strictly apply, fairness prevented substitution of a more severe sentence. The court took account of the appellant’s custody during proceedings in which he was acquitted, the lapse of time, and the expiry of the original six-month period. It substituted an absolute discharge and quashed the victim surcharge order.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2024] EWCA Crim 1027: conviction appeal dismissed; sentence appeal allowed. The seven-day suspended sentence and victim surcharge order were quashed, and an absolute discharge was substituted.
• Wood Green Crown Court — The appellant was convicted of failing without reasonable excuse to surrender to bail and sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment suspended for six months.