R v Paul Ashmore

A statutory presumption of dangerousness is not determinative merely because qualifying convictions exist. The sentencing court must examine the nature and circumstances of the relevant offences, any relevant pattern of behaviour and information about the offender. For a person just over 18, maturity, developmental age, impulsivity, negative influences and prospects of rehabilitation may be highly relevant. Failure to evaluate those matters can make an indeterminate public-protection sentence wrong in principle and manifestly excessive. Appellate review is confined to the legal framework applicable at sentencing and does not take account of later events. Where dangerousness is not established, an indeterminate sentence may be quashed and replaced with a determinate sentence if the otherwise appropriate custodial term is not manifestly excessive.

Following guilty pleas to causing grievous bodily harm with intent and breaching an antisocial behaviour order, the applicant, who was just over 18 at the time of the offence, was sentenced by the Crown Court at Manchester on 6 December 2005. He received an indeterminate public-protection sentence with a minimum term of 17 months, together with a concurrent 15-month sentence.

The Registrar referred an application for an extension of 6,771 days to appeal against sentence. The proposed appeal challenged the assessment of dangerousness, the treatment of the applicant’s youth and previous conviction, the sentence imposed and alleged disparity with co-defendants. The central issue was whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive under the law applicable in 2005.

In the single judgment of Holgate J, delivered for the court, the extension of time and leave to appeal were granted and the appeal was allowed in part.

1. Under R v Roberts [2016] EWCA Crim 71, the court had to assess the sentence by reference to the legal framework applicable when it was imposed. Later changes in the law and subsequent events, including the applicant’s later release, recall and offending, were irrelevant.

2. The former dangerous-offender provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 required careful application of the presumption in section 229(3). The decision whether the applicant was dangerous involved an evaluative judgment akin to the exercise of a discretion. Under R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864, as reaffirmed in R v Leighton Williams [2024] EWCA Crim 686, appellate intervention required an error of principle or a conclusion outside the range properly open to the sentencing judge.

3. The court emphasised the particular importance of youth and maturity. Relatively young offenders may change and develop more quickly than adults. There is no sudden change in maturity at 18, and the sentencer must consider developmental and emotional age, impulsivity, inexperience, emotional volatility, negative influences and prospects of rehabilitation.

4. The sentencing judge had not identified the applicant’s role in the earlier offence, identified a relevant pattern of behaviour, assessed his biological or developmental maturity, or considered the effect of those matters and his rehabilitation prospects on future risk. The pre-sentence report contained pointers to immaturity, peer susceptibility, alcohol misuse and a violent upbringing. Proper evaluation of the material meant that the only proper conclusion was that the applicant could not reasonably be treated as dangerous. The presumption was therefore displaced.

5. The sentence described as detention for public protection was unavailable because the applicant was over 18 when convicted; the relevant statutory provision would have been imprisonment for public protection under former section 225(3). However, the court substituted a determinate sentence because the appropriate sentence after a guilty plea was three years and six months, and the five-year-three-month term after trial was not manifestly excessive. The disparity ground failed. The sentence on count 1 was quashed and replaced with three years and six months’ detention in a young offender institution. The concurrent sentence on count 3 remained undisturbed.

• Crown Court at Manchester: Following guilty pleas, the applicant was sentenced on 6 December 2005 to an indeterminate public-protection sentence with a minimum term of 17 months, plus a concurrent 15-month sentence.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Granted the extension of time and leave to appeal, allowed the appeal in part, quashed the sentence on count 1 and substituted three years and six months’ detention in a young offender institution. The sentence on count 3 remained undisturbed: [2024] EWCA Crim 1083.