PRP v R

In a sexual-offence trial, evidence that a complainant was raped or subjected to domestic abuse by another person is inadmissible under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 if irrelevant to an issue for the jury. Mental disorder evidence is not evidence of sexual behaviour for section 41(5), and admitting it may invite sexual-history myths. No doli incapax direction is required for charged offending committed after the defendant’s fourteenth birthday. Earlier unindicted incidents did not make the convictions unsafe where they mainly exposed inconsistencies and the jury received proper directions. A material contribution to psychiatric harm does not make an offender legally responsible for all harm. Youth and immaturity may justify a sentence reduction. The sentence was reduced from 18 to 16 years.

Following a trial at Maidstone Crown Court, the appellant was convicted on 22 January 2024 of four indecent assaults and three rapes against his sister, and received an overall sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment.

He appealed against conviction on the admission of evidence concerning alleged sexual and domestic abuse by his former husband, and on the absence of a direction concerning doli incapax and earlier unindicted incidents. He appealed against sentence on the use of weapons, attribution of psychological harm, and the effect of his mental health, age and maturity. The central questions were whether the convictions were unsafe and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The appeal against sentence was allowed, and the sentence was reduced from 18 years to 16 years. The other concurrent sentences remained unchanged.

1. Evidence concerning the former husband. The first application, based on an allegation that the complainant had made false allegations against her husband, had no evidential foundation. The later application, based on the allegations being true, was also correctly refused. Evidence that the complainant had been raped by her husband was not relevant to an issue the jury had to decide and therefore did not fall within section 41(3)(a) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. The limited evidence about the complainant’s mental health was not evidence of her sexual behaviour for the purposes of section 41(5). Admission of the evidence would have served no proper purpose and might have encouraged the sexual-history myths identified in R v A (No.2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. The refusal did not render the convictions unsafe.
2. Doli incapax and earlier incidents. The common-law presumption of doli incapax did not apply to the indicted conduct because the appellant was aged 14 years and five months when the earliest counts began. Evidence suggesting that other incidents had occurred before the indictment did not require a doli incapax direction. Although the judge had not given the direction suggested in R v AYS [2023] EWCA Crim 730; [2024] 1 Cr App R 3, the convictions remained safe. The earlier incidents principally exposed inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts, and the jury had received full and fair directions on those inconsistencies and on reliability.
3. Sentence. The judge was entitled to find, on the evidence, that handcuffs or a knife had been used on at least five occasions. However, a finding that the offending materially contributed to severe psychological harm did not make the appellant legally responsible for all of that harm. Psychiatric harm could be apportioned between causes, as recognised in Barber v Somerset [2002] EWCA Civ 76; [2002] ICR 613 and [2004] UKHL 13; [2004] 1 WLR 1089. The judge’s contrary statement must have had an upward effect on sentence. The evidence did not establish that the appellant’s self-harm threats reduced culpability, but his behaviour, schooling and general immaturity justified a greater reduction for age and immaturity. Becoming an adult during the offending did not establish that he had become mature.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): by [2024] EWCA Crim 1150, the conviction appeal was dismissed and the sentence appeal was allowed. The sentence was reduced from 18 years to 16 years.
• Maidstone Crown Court: the appellant was convicted on 22 January 2024 and sentenced to an overall term of 18 years’ imprisonment.