R v Curtis Pearson

A restraining order must be necessary to protect the person concerned, and each of its terms and duration must be proportionate to that protective purpose. A geographical exclusion must also identify its area with sufficient precision. A victim’s reasonable sense of safety in their own town may justify an exclusion, but a duration exceeding what that protection requires is disproportionate. Under Sentencing Code, section 325(4), the sentencing court must state in open court the number of qualifying-curfew days to be credited against sentence; it cannot leave that calculation entirely to administration.

The appellant was sentenced in the Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne to 25 months’ imprisonment for intentional strangulation and assault, with a consecutive three-month term for breach of a suspended sentence. The Recorder also imposed a ten-year restraining order protecting the complainant, including a prohibition on entering Morpeth.

A single judge refused permission to appeal against sentence but granted permission to challenge the Morpeth prohibition. The appellant contended that it was geographically uncertain, unnecessary, and disproportionate. The appeal also identified an error in the treatment of credit for time spent on electronically monitored curfew.

1. Appeal allowed to a limited extent. The court varied the geographical condition in the restraining order and reduced its duration. It also declared the appellant’s entitlement to credit for qualifying curfew.
2. The court applied the restraining-order principles derived from R v Khellaf [2016] EWCA Crim 1297. The protected person’s views must be considered; an order must be necessary; and its terms and duration must be proportionate to the harm against which it protects. Particular care is required where the order may affect appropriate parent-and-child contact.
3. The prohibition on entering Morpeth remained necessary. In light of the violent offending and the complainant’s stated fear when in public, she was entitled to feel safe in her own town and to have a remedy if she encountered the appellant there. The existing no-contact and building restrictions did not make the geographical condition unnecessary.
4. The word “Morpeth” lacked sufficient geographical precision. The court therefore defined it as the area within the parish boundary of Morpeth as expressed by Northumberland County Council. The ten-year duration of that condition was disproportionate and was reduced to five years.
5. Under section 325(4) of the Sentencing Code, the Crown Court was required to state in open court the number of qualifying-curfew days credited towards sentence. It was not sufficient to leave the matter for administrative calculation. The parties agreed that 400 qualifying-curfew days produced 200 days’ credit, and the court made a declaration accordingly.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2024] EWCA Crim 1216, allowed the appeal to the limited extent of redefining the geographical prohibition and reducing it from ten to five years; made a declaration of 200 days’ qualifying-curfew credit.
• Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne — On 29 May 2024, sentenced the appellant and imposed a ten-year restraining order which included a prohibition on entering Morpeth.