R v Paul Michael Reed

An appellate court will not ordinarily admit psychiatric evidence that was available for use at trial but was not deployed there, particularly where its admissibility is disputed and its late admission would not serve the interests of justice.

A represented defendant cannot properly advance a late allegation of inadequate advocacy without waiving privilege and giving trial counsel an opportunity to explain the decisions criticised. A later amendment to a protective order does not itself show that its earlier terms were unclear. Hopeless applications which waste court resources may justify a loss of time order.

The applicant sought extensions of time to apply for leave to appeal against conviction and to renew an application concerning sentence, after a single judge had refused the applications. He relied on a pre-trial psychiatric report, sought further cross-examination of a complainant, raised a complaint about the timing of the police charge, and contended that a later amendment to a Sexual Harm Prevention Order demonstrated that the earlier order was unclear.

The applications came from the Crown Court at Guildford before Her Honour Judge Lees. The central question was whether any proposed ground gave the intended appeals a realistic prospect of success.

1. The applications were refused. The court agreed with the single judge’s full reasons. Neither the proposed appeal against conviction nor that concerning sentence had a realistic prospect of success.

2. The psychiatric report could not be introduced on appeal. It had been prepared before trial and was available to be deployed then if relevant and admissible. Its admission had never been sought. The applicant had not waived privilege, so the court could not know why trial counsel had not relied on it or properly criticise counsel for that decision. The Crown would in any event have disputed admissibility and, if necessary, called its own expert evidence. It was far too late to introduce the report, and admission would not be in the interests of justice.

3. The request to recall the first complainant for further cross-examination was impermissible. The applicant had been represented by experienced counsel, had not previously advanced a complaint about the cross-examination, and had not waived privilege to permit counsel to answer it. The proposed further questions did not concern the heart of the relevant counts and could not realistically affect the safety of the convictions.

4. The delay in charging the applicant was irrelevant to the proposed appeals. The later amendment of the Sexual Harm Prevention Order did not undermine the clarity or certainty of the order in force when it was breached. The original order clearly prohibited contact with women unknown to the applicant, and the jury had received proper directions on the meaning of “known”. The amendment instead made the order more restrictive in relation to shop assistants.

5. The court made a loss of time order. The applications were hopeless, wasted court time and resources, and formed part of the applicant’s attempts to manipulate proceedings. Accordingly, 28 days spent in custody would not count towards the sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): applications for extensions of time to seek leave to appeal against conviction and sentence refused; a 28-day loss of time order was made: [2024] EWCA Crim 1222.
• Crown Court at Guildford: conviction and sentence before Her Honour Judge Lees; no reported citation stated in the judgment.