R v Insar Hussain

An appellate court should interfere with apparently inconsistent jury verdicts only where the inconsistency is so serious that no reasonable jury properly applying its mind to the facts could have reached the verdicts.

A jury may accept a complainant’s evidence on one count while remaining unsure about another. In sentencing multiple offences concurrently, the sentence may reflect the totality of the offending and exceed the guideline range for an individual count. Discretion to adjust a lawful sentence for unrelated remand custody is exceptional and should be exercised only where the statutory regime would cause real injustice.

After a lengthy trial at the Crown Court at Manchester, Insar Hussain was convicted of rape and two child sexual offences against C1. Mohammed Ghani was convicted of five child sexual offences against C1.

Hussain appealed against one conviction and renewed applications for leave concerning two other convictions and sentence. Both Hussain and Ghani renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence. The principal issues were whether Hussain’s conviction was inconsistent with other verdicts, whether the convictions were unsafe, whether Hussain’s sentence was wrongly categorised or should have been reduced for unrelated remand custody, and whether Ghani’s concurrent sentence was manifestly excessive.

Appeal and applications dismissed. Hussain’s renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused, his appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence by both appellants were refused.

1. On inconsistent verdicts, the court applied R v Durante (1972) 56 Cr App R 708 and R v Fanning [2016] EWCA Crim 550. The appellant must show more than inconsistency. The verdicts must be so inconsistent as to demand appellate interference, meaning that no reasonable jury properly applying its mind to the facts could have reached them.
2. The jury was entitled to consider each count separately. It could be sure of a complainant’s credibility or reliability on one count while remaining unsure on another. The acquittals on other allegations did not amount to wholesale rejection of C1’s evidence and did not make the conviction on count 30 unsafe.
3. The sentencing judge was entitled to categorise Hussain’s offence, find that alcohol had facilitated it, and take account of the aggravating features. The sentence was stiff but not manifestly excessive.
4. The court reaffirmed the principles in R v Prenga [2017] EWCA Crim 2149 and R v Dacres [2024] EWCA Crim 447. The statutory scheme under the CJA 2003 is comprehensive. Any discretion to modify an otherwise lawful sentence for unrelated remand custody is exceptional and should be exercised only where applying the statutory regime would cause real injustice. Reliance on R v Williams [2021] EWCA Crim 1915 without addressing those principles should fail.
5. In concurrent sentencing, a sentence may reflect the overall criminality of several offences and may exceed the guideline range for an individual offence. Ghani’s sentence was not arguably manifestly excessive.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Hussain’s appeal against conviction was dismissed. Renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence were refused, as were Ghani’s renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence.
2. Crown Court at Manchester, Minshull Street — Hussain and Ghani were convicted and sentenced following a jury trial.