Sharriff Dacres v R

Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 240ZA provides a comprehensive statutory scheme for crediting time in custody. A sentencing court has an exceptional discretion to modify an otherwise lawful sentence only where the scheme would cause real injustice. Unusual facts alone do not suffice.

Time spent serving a sentence later quashed remains detention in connection with another matter for section 240ZA(4). The quashing does not convert sentence time into remand time. An extension of time to appeal requires consideration of all circumstances. A very long, unexplained delay requires exceptionally cogent merits before the interests of justice can justify reopening the sentence.

The applicant was serving a 14-year sentence imposed at Kingston upon Thames Crown Court for conspiracy to transfer or sell prohibited weapons. Before that sentence, he had been convicted of possessing a prohibited weapon and had served 452 days of the resulting seven-year sentence. That conviction was later quashed and the proposed retrial was not pursued.

HMPPS ultimately credited the applicant with the period for which he had been remanded in connection with the possession allegation. It did not credit the period when he had been serving the quashed sentence. More than four and a half years after sentence, the applicant sought permission to appeal. He contended that the sentencing judge should have reduced the conspiracy sentence to reflect that period in custody.

1. The application for an extension of time was refused. The proposed application for leave to appeal against sentence therefore fell.

2. The statutory credit scheme in Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 240ZA is administered by HMPPS. It is comprehensive. Under section 240ZA(4), a day on which an offender is also detained in connection with another matter does not count as time served. The applicant’s detention while serving the possession sentence was within that policy when it occurred. The later quashing of that sentence did not alter its character.

3. The Court applied the exceptional-discretion approach in Prenga [2017] EWCA Crim 2149. A judge may adjust an otherwise proper sentence only where applying the statutory scheme would cause real injustice. Exceptional circumstances must be more than unusual. They must demonstrate that the statutory scheme fails to provide the appropriate outcome.

4. The applicant had not shown such injustice. The fact that his possession conviction was quashed, and that the retrial was later not pursued, did not make the case exceptional. He was not worse off than if the conviction had stood: a consecutive sentence for the conspiracy would probably have produced a more onerous overall outcome. A reduction would also shorten the period on licence, which was relevant to overall justice and public protection.

5. The delay of more than four and a half years had no proper explanation. Although absence of an explanation is not an absolute bar, it imposed a very high hurdle. The proposed grounds lacked the exceptional cogency needed to overcome the delay and the public interest in finality.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): in Sharriff Dacres v R [2024] EWCA Crim 447, refused an extension of time to appeal against sentence. The application for leave to appeal consequently fell.
• Crown Court at Kingston upon Thames: on 18 October 2018, imposed a sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to transfer or sell prohibited weapons.
• Court of Appeal: on 15 May 2018, quashed the applicant’s conviction for possession of a prohibited weapon and ordered a retrial. The prosecution later did not pursue that retrial.