Gareth Taylor v R

Under the pre-amendment dangerous-offender provisions, a previous specified offence did not by itself establish dangerousness. The court had to consider the offences, any pattern of behaviour and information about the offender, and decide whether it was unreasonable to conclude that further offending posed a significant risk of serious harm. Serious harm included psychological harm to future victims. The absence of serious harm to previous victims did not prevent that conclusion. An appellate court should not interfere with the sentencing judge’s evaluative assessment merely because it might have reached a different conclusion. A formulaic citation of the governing guidance was unnecessary where the sentencing remarks showed that it had been applied.

The applicant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Burnley in 2007 to sexual activity with a child contrary to section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and to breaching a sexual offences prevention order contrary to section 113(1) of that Act. He received an imprisonment for public protection sentence with a minimum term of 18 months, together with a concurrent sentence for the breach.

The Registrar referred an application for an extension of 5,866 days to seek leave to appeal against sentence. The issue was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle under the dangerous-offender provisions in force in 2007, including whether the statutory assumption of dangerousness had been displaced.

Disposition. The application for an extension of time was refused because it would serve no purpose. Leave to appeal was refused.

1. The court’s task was confined to deciding whether the sentence imposed under the former statutory scheme was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. The repeal of imprisonment for public protection sentences and wider questions about the justice of that scheme were irrelevant to that task. The court applied the approach in R v Roberts [2016] EWCA Crim 71, [2016] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 14.
2. Under Chapter 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the section 9 offence was a serious specified offence. Under section 229, an adult with a previous specified offence conviction was subject to a rebuttable assumption of dangerousness. The court had to consider the statutory information about the offences, any pattern of behaviour and the offender. An IPP sentence followed under section 225 unless the statutory conditions for a life sentence applied.
3. The guidance in R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864, [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 3 did not require a sentencing judge to cite the case or set out its principles formulaically. A fair reading of the sentencing remarks as a whole was sufficient. The judge had considered the applicant’s age, immaturity, learning difficulties and psychological problems, while also considering the evidence of repeated and similar offending and the failure of extensive probation intervention.
4. The absence of serious psychological harm to the earlier victims did not prevent a finding of future serious-harm risk. It was fortuitous that such harm had not apparently occurred. Further penetrative sexual offending against children risked serious psychological harm to future victims.
5. The proximity of the two offences, their similar circumstances and the breach of the sexual offences prevention order supported the conclusion that the applicant’s behaviour had become entrenched. The change from penile to digital penetration did not demonstrate de-escalation. The judge was unarguably entitled to find the applicant dangerous and impose an IPP sentence.
6. The assessment of dangerousness was an evaluative judgment akin to the exercise of a discretion. Applying R v Williams [2024] EWCA Crim 686, the Court of Appeal could not interfere merely because it might have reached a different conclusion. There was no error of principle and the decision was within the range properly open to the judge.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): application for an extension of time refused and leave to appeal refused, [2024] EWCA Crim 1488.
• Crown Court at Burnley: on 21 May 2007 imposed an IPP sentence with a minimum term of 18 months for the section 9 offence, together with a concurrent two-year sentence for breach of the sexual offences prevention order.