R v Rashida Ayub

In sentencing appeals for serious conspiracies to facilitate breaches of UK immigration law, the court must assess whether the offending requires deterrence and immediate custody before weighing mitigation. Age, ill-health, vulnerability, prison conditions and unjustified delay may justify a substantial reduction, although they do not reduce culpability. A defendant is not entitled to a reduction equivalent to guilty-plea credit merely because trial and sentencing were delayed. Where the sentencing judge has carefully evaluated those matters, the appellate court will not interfere unless the sentence is arguably manifestly excessive. For serious, planned and commercial offending involving multiple facilitations and a significant role, a suspended sentence or community order may be unrealistic, and immediate custody may remain necessary.

After a trial in the Crown Court at Manchester, the applicant was convicted on 20 May 2024 of conspiring to facilitate a breach of UK immigration law and was sentenced on 22 August 2024 to four years’ imprisonment. The sentencing judge found that she had been a significant and willing facilitator in a planned, commercial operation involving multiple trips and illegal entrants.

Leave to appeal against sentence was refused by a single judge. The applicant renewed her application, arguing that insufficient weight had been given to her age, ill-health, personal circumstances and the delay between the offending and sentence. She also argued that a suspended sentence or community order should have been imposed.

1. Application refused. The Court of Appeal accepted that the offending was very serious and that, before personal mitigation and delay were considered, it required a deterrent sentence.
2. The conviction arose from conduct contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. The trial judge was well placed to assess the evidence and was entitled to find that the applicant was a significant facilitator, had made three facilitations or attempts, acted for financial gain and was not acting under duress.
3. The sentencing judge had carefully considered the applicant’s previous good character, age, physical and mental health, mobility difficulties, prison conditions and the impact of delay. Those matters could reduce the sentence because imprisonment would have a greater effect on her, but they did not reduce the culpability of the offending.
4. The sentencing judge was also entitled to distinguish the effect of delay from credit for a guilty plea. A defendant should not obtain the same reduction as would have followed a guilty plea merely because the case proceeded to trial. Any unjustified delay causing detriment should nevertheless be reflected in the sentence.
5. The judge assessed the sentence before mitigation at six years and reduced it to four years, a reduction of one third. That reduction was substantial, appropriate and fully justified by the mitigation, delay and current prison conditions.
6. The offending was too serious for a sentence capable of suspension to be a realistic option. In any event, only an immediate custodial sentence was appropriate. Weighing the aggravating factors against the mitigation and delay, the sentence was not arguably manifestly excessive. The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 13 December 2024, the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused: [2024] EWCA Crim 1584.
• Single judge: Refused leave to appeal; the date was not stated in the judgment.
• Crown Court at Manchester (Minshull Street): Following conviction after trial on 20 May 2024, the applicant was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment on 22 August 2024.