R v Jade Melina Rahman

A defendant relying on section 45(1) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 must adduce evidence capable of supporting every element of that defence. The defence is unavailable where the defendant’s own evidence denies conduct constituting the offence and does not support compulsion to commit criminal conduct or the absence of a realistic alternative. An acquittal on a separate count does not, without more, establish that a jury accepted duress.

Under section 59 of the Sentencing Code, a relevant sentencing guideline must be followed unless the court is satisfied that doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice. That exception sets a high threshold; it is insufficient that another judge might have sentenced differently.

The applicant was tried at the Crown Court at Cambridge on a money-laundering conspiracy count and two counts of being concerned in making offers to supply controlled drugs. The drug counts arose from text-message exchanges concerning cannabis and cocaine. She maintained that the messages were either jokes or efforts to appease her abusive partner, and relied on evidence of domestic abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder.

The jury acquitted her of the money-laundering count but convicted her of the two drug counts. She received concurrent sentences of two years’ and three months’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months. She sought extensions of time and leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. The central issues were whether the statutory defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 should have been left to the jury, whether the summing-up fairly put her case, and whether the sentencing guideline should have been departed from.

1. The Court refused the applications for extensions of time and for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence. Neither proposed appeal had merit.

2. The statutory defence in section 45(1) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 required the applicant to raise evidence supporting each element. Following R v MK; R v Gega [2018] QB 86, only then would the prosecution bear the burden of disproving an element to the criminal standard. On counts 3 and 4, the applicant’s case was that the messages were not criminal offers at all, but jokes or attempts to improve relations with a friend. Although abuse could explain a wish to keep her partner happy, there was no evidence that she was compelled to engage in conduct amounting to either offence, or that a reasonable person in her situation would have had no realistic alternative. The defence therefore had no evidential basis on those counts.

3. The judge’s summing-up sufficiently put the defence case. The jury had to be sure that the messages were not sent for the innocent reasons advanced by the applicant, and the evidence supporting conviction was overwhelming. The acquittal on the distinct money-laundering count did not establish that the jury had positively accepted duress.

4. Section 59 of the Sentencing Code required the judge to follow the relevant guideline unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice. That was a high hurdle. The sentencing judge was entitled to apply the guideline, while giving full weight to the applicant’s substantial mitigation. The suspended sentences were neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — refused the applicant’s applications for extensions of time and for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence: [2024] EWCA Crim 1719.
• Crown Court at Cambridge — the applicant was acquitted of conspiracy to convert and transfer criminal property, but convicted of two offences of being concerned in making offers to supply controlled drugs. She received concurrent suspended sentences.