R v Jake Calow

A sentencing judge may, in an appropriate case, set a sentence above the top of the applicable category range where the aggravating factors, considered overall, justify that course. This may include a very serious injury caused in the same incident, together with other distinct aggravating features.

A defendant is not entitled to the exception for a delayed guilty plea merely because an expert collision report was served after the plea and trial preparation hearing. The exception does not apply where the report was not central to deciding whether the driving was dangerous and the delay enabled the defendant to assess the strength of the prosecution case.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Winchester to causing death by dangerous driving and causing serious injury by dangerous driving. He had also been committed for sentence after guilty pleas to causing death by driving uninsured and aggravated vehicle taking where death was caused.

A head-on collision caused the death of one person and life-changing injuries to another. The sentencing judge imposed eight years’ imprisonment for the lead offence, with concurrent sentences for the remaining offences, and a driving disqualification.

The appellant contended that the total sentence was manifestly excessive, that insufficient weight had been given to mitigation and remorse, and that he should have received greater credit for his guilty pleas.

1. Appeal dismissed. The eight-year sentence was not manifestly excessive.
2. The judge correctly selected causing death by dangerous driving as the lead offence and reflected the other offences through concurrent sentences loaded onto that sentence. There is no objection in principle to increasing a sentence from the category starting point to a figure above the category maximum where the aggravating factors overall warrant it.
3. The judge was entitled to take the sentence above the nine-year top of the Category B range. The very serious, life-changing injury to the second victim was an express aggravating factor. It was properly considered with the large vehicle, the absence of consent to drive it, and the absence of insurance when death was caused. The mitigating features did not outweigh those factors.
4. The judge did not disregard remorse. She was entitled to give it reduced weight because there was material supporting her conclusion that the appellant’s reaction was partly motivated by concern for his own position.
5. The 20 per cent guilty-plea reduction was justified. The collision report was not central to whether the appellant’s driving was dangerous. By the plea and trial preparation hearing he had legal advice and sufficient knowledge to decide whether to plead guilty. The late plea was a delay to assess the prosecution case, not a case within the paragraph F1 exception in the guilty-plea guideline.
6. The sentencing judge’s error about the release point did not affect the length of sentence. Although the driving disqualification should under the relevant statutory provisions have been longer, Criminal Appeal Act 1968, section 11(3), prevented the court from increasing it on the appellant’s appeal. The disqualification order was therefore unchanged.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeal against sentence dismissed: [2024] EWCA Crim 1863.
• Crown Court at Winchester: On 13 October 2023, imposed eight years’ imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving, with concurrent sentences for the remaining offences.
• Basingstoke Magistrates’ Court: On 29 June 2023, accepted guilty pleas to the offences committed for sentence and committed the appellant to the Crown Court for sentence.