R v Steven Carl Evans

On an Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, a sentence is unduly lenient only if it falls outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge. The Court of Appeal must respect the first-instance judge’s assessment and may not simply resentence; leave is exceptional and the provision addresses gross error. A life sentence under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 remains a last resort. The totality principle permits concurrent sentences and prevents simply adding notional terms, but the resulting sentence must reflect the true gravity of all offending. Here, 24 years was too low: 30 years’ custody was required, with the eight-year extended licence unchanged.

This was a reference by the Attorney General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 concerning sentences imposed on the respondent after his conviction for 37 offences, mostly serious sexual offences, committed against four victims between 2015 and 2021.

On 30 November 2023, HHJ Corbett-Jones, sitting at the Crown Court at Manchester (Minshull Street), imposed an extended sentence under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020, comprising 24 years’ custody and an eight-year extended licence. The reference challenged the custodial term and the decision not to impose life imprisonment under section 285. The central issues were whether the sentence was unduly lenient, whether life imprisonment was required, and how the totality principle applied.

The Court granted leave to refer the sentences and increased the custodial period from 24 to 30 years. The eight-year extended licence and the remaining sentencing arrangements were left unchanged.

1. Section 36 principles. A sentence is unduly lenient only where it falls outside the range that the first-instance judge might reasonably consider appropriate. Leave is granted only in exceptional circumstances and not in borderline cases. The jurisdiction addresses gross error. The Court does not sit as a sentencing court of first instance and cannot simply substitute its own view. The first-instance judge is particularly well placed to assess competing factors. These principles were summarised in Attorney-General’s Reference (R v Azad) [2021] EWCA Crim 1846; [2022] 2 Cr App R(S) 10 and reflected the guidance in Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 1989) (1990) 90 Cr App R 366.
2. Life sentence. The judge considered section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and was entitled, after careful consideration and with the advantage of having tried the case, to conclude that life imprisonment was unnecessary. A life sentence remains a last resort, as explained in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 27 of 2013) (R v Burinskas) [2013] EWCA Crim 334; [2014] 2 Cr App R(S) 45. The Court could not say that the sentencing judge was not reasonably entitled to reach that conclusion.
3. Totality and custody. The 24-year custodial period was too low given the gravity of the offending as a whole. At least 20 years was required for the offences against one victim alone, with further serious offending against other victims. The totality principle required respect for the overall sentence and permitted the highest sentence to be imposed on a lead count with the other sentences concurrent. It did not permit the Court simply to add notional sentences, but the final sentence had to reflect the true overall gravity.
4. Order. The sentence on count 30 was substituted with a 30-year custodial period. The resulting extended sentence was 38 years, comprising 30 years’ custody and an eight-year extended licence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 20 February 2024, under [2024] EWCA Crim 237, leave was granted under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The custodial period was increased to 30 years.
• Crown Court at Manchester (Minshull Street): On 30 November 2023, HHJ Corbett-Jones imposed an extended sentence of 32 years under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020, comprising 24 years’ custody and an eight-year extended licence.