R v Amaru Anderson

Under the pre-28 June 2022 version of Sentencing Act 2020 s 313(2), the exception to a seven-year minimum term is open-textured. An offender’s health condition relates to the offender and cannot be excluded in principle. The issue is fact-sensitive. Serious illness does not automatically justify a lesser sentence, but compelling evidence that imprisonment makes the condition materially harder to treat or manage may support departure. If the sentencing court has excluded health from consideration, the appellate court must reconsider the issue afresh. Departure still requires proof that applying the minimum would be unjust in all the circumstances. Here, the misdirection did not result in a manifestly excessive sentence.

The applicant pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing heroin and crack cocaine with intent to supply. He had previous class A drug-trafficking convictions and was sentenced at Chelmsford Crown Court to concurrent terms of 67 months, after 20 per cent guilty-plea credit. The sentencing judge refused to disapply the statutory minimum because of the applicant’s serious health conditions. The application for leave to appeal was made 234 days late. The central issues were whether ill-health could constitute a relevant particular circumstance under s 313(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020, whether the evidence made the minimum term unjust or the sentence manifestly excessive, and whether time should be extended.

1. Disposition. The Recorder was wrong in principle to conclude that ill-health could never be relevant to disapplying the statutory minimum. The court considered the sentencing issue afresh, but held that the applicant had not shown that the minimum term was unjust or that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The extension of time was refused, leave to appeal was refused, and the application was dismissed.
2. Statutory construction. The pre-amendment wording of s 313(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020 required a seven-year term unless particular circumstances relating to the offence or offender made it unjust in all the circumstances. The provision did not prescribe an exhaustive list of relevant circumstances. An offender’s health condition therefore had to be capable of consideration, although its significance was fact-sensitive.
3. Medical evidence. Serious medical conditions do not automatically justify a lesser sentence. The authorities, including R v Bernard [1997] 1 Crim App R (S) 135, R v W [2012] EWCA Crim 355 and R v McMeekin [2018] EWCA Crim 2373, supported the possibility of mercy in exceptional circumstances. Difficulty treating or managing a condition in prison was not automatically sufficient, but compelling evidence could be relevant, as illustrated by R v James [2011] EWCA Crim 2411.
4. Application. The applicant’s illnesses were serious and potentially life-limiting. However, the prison report did not show that imprisonment was materially more onerous because of his health or that his condition was being inadequately managed in custody. The evidence therefore did not justify disapplying the minimum term.
5. Time. The delay resulted from repeated errors by the applicant’s solicitors. Such delay could have been excused if the appeal had merit, but the proposed grounds were not reasonably arguable.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), [2024] EWCA Crim 253: held that the sentencing judge had misdirected himself about the relevance of ill-health, but upheld the result after reconsidering the sentence; extension of time and leave to appeal were refused.
2. Chelmsford Crown Court: sentenced the applicant to concurrent terms of 67 months for two class A drug-trafficking offences.