R v Jennifer Blackadder

Deferred sentence is an exceptional sentencing disposal. It is appropriate only for a small group of cases near a custody or community-sentence threshold where compliance with clearly specified requirements could realistically justify a lesser sentence. The court must identify in advance the sentence that would follow compliance, and that sentence must be a realistic possibility. Deferment is improper where the offending necessarily requires immediate custody, or where the deferment period cannot materially inform sentencing. The offender’s consent and undertaking to comply with the requirements are statutory conditions.

The Attorney General referred the offender’s sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. After pleading guilty to breach of a restraining order, assault by beating, stalking involving fear of violence and intimidating a witness, the offender received a three-month deferment of sentence in the Crown Court at Sheffield. The judge had identified custodial sentences totalling more than six years before applying totality, but wished to obtain further evidence and give the offender an opportunity to demonstrate compliance.

The Attorney General argued that deferment was unduly lenient because the offending was far beyond the custody threshold and a suspended sentence was not realistically available. The offender argued that the order was in substance an adjournment for further reports. The central issues were whether the order was a deferment of sentence and whether that disposal was lawfully available.

1. Reference allowed. The court granted leave to refer, quashed the deferment of sentence as unduly lenient and substituted a total sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment.
2. The order was a deferment of sentence, not an adjournment. Its terms and the judge’s discussion of orders that could accompany deferment showed that he intended to defer sentence. The court therefore applied the statutory and common-law principles governing deferment.
3. Following and endorsing R v Swinbourne [2023] EWCA Crim 906, reported at [2024] 1 Cr App R(S) 8, the court held that deferment is confined to a small group of cases near a significant sentencing threshold. The court must specify the required behaviour and identify the lesser sentence that would follow compliance. Deferment is unavailable where no sentence other than immediate custody could properly be imposed.
4. The offender’s lengthy history of breaching court orders and committing further offences meant that punishment and protection of the victims required substantially greater weight than rehabilitation. Even after a generous totality reduction, the appropriate sentence was well above the range in which suspension could be considered. A suspended sentence would itself have been unduly lenient.
5. The three-month period could not reliably test future behaviour. No specific requirement was imposed which could materially inform sentencing, and the offender’s past pattern of reoffending after short periods of compliance made the proposed evidence inadequate. The court also noted that the offender’s consent and undertaking to comply were statutory conditions, although the transcript did not show that she had been asked to consent.
6. The court imposed 12 months for breach of the restraining order, three months concurrent for assault, two years concurrent for stalking and witness intimidation but consecutive to the indictment sentences, and activated 18 months of the earlier suspended sentence consecutively. The total sentence was four years and six months’ imprisonment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): on the Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, leave was granted, the deferred sentence imposed by the Crown Court was quashed as unduly lenient, and a total sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment was substituted: [2024] EWCA Crim 318.
• Crown Court at Sheffield: following guilty pleas, sentence was deferred for three months on 7 December 2023.