R v Jason Grundell

Evidence of reprehensible conduct shortly after a charged offence is not automatically evidence that has to do with the facts under section 98(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. That provision must be read narrowly with the statutory bad-character gateways. Evidence may nevertheless be admissible under section 101(1)(d) where it is relevant to an important matter in issue, including the parties’ relationship and the defendant’s state of mind. The important-explanatory gateway under section 101(1)(c) is not a substitute for gateway (d). It requires genuine difficulty in understanding the other evidence and substantial value for understanding the case as a whole.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Leeds of two rapes against C. The prosecution also relied on evidence of a violent domestic incident occurring about 14 hours after the second alleged rape. The trial judge admitted that evidence under section 98(a) and, alternatively, as important explanatory evidence under section 101(1)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The appellant challenged its admission under three grounds, including section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The central issues were whether the incident had to do with the facts of the charged offences, whether it was important explanatory evidence, and whether its admission or use rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Disposition. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The convictions were safe.
2. Section 98(a). Sections 98 and 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 form a calibrated statutory scheme. Section 98(a) must not be construed as creating a wide exemption for reprehensible conduct. The narrow construction commended in R v Mullings [2010] EWCA Crim 2820 was correct and was applied. The 14-hour gap and the different nature of the events meant that the incident was separate from the second alleged rape. It therefore did not have to do with the facts of that offence. The court distinguished R v AAM [2021] EWCA Crim 1720.
3. Important explanatory evidence. Section 101(1)(c), read with section 102, requires evidence without which the jury would find it impossible or difficult properly to understand the other evidence, together with substantial value for understanding the case as a whole. Gateway (c) is not a substitute for gateway (d), and possible jury curiosity about a reporting delay is insufficient. The evidence of the alleged rapes was clear without the incident, so this gateway was not available. The court followed the guidance in R v D, R v P, R v U [2011] EWCA Crim 1474 and applied R v L [2012] EWCA Crim 316.
4. Gateway (d) and fairness. Section 101(1)(d) is not confined to convictions demonstrating propensity or to rebutting coincidence. The incident was relevant to the important issue of the parties’ relationship and the appellant’s state of mind, including his tendency to override C’s wishes. The evidence was therefore admissible. Its probative and relevant character meant that exclusion under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 would have been inconsistent with fairness. The jury direction properly identified the evidence’s relevance and prohibited its use as evidence of a propensity to commit sexual offences.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). On 13 March 2024, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction and held that the convictions were safe: [2024] EWCA Crim 364.
2. Crown Court at Leeds. On 8 June 2023, before His Honour Judge Batiste and a jury, the appellant was convicted of two counts of rape. On 31 July 2023, he received an extended sentence of 17 years.