R v Nathan Shultz

For causing death by dangerous driving, seriousness under the applicable guideline is determined predominantly by the standard of driving. Level 1 requires features such as a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of very bad driving, gross impairment from substantial alcohol or drugs, or a sufficiently serious group of determinants. Alcohol consumption without significant impairment does not satisfy the gross-impairment characteristic. Age, lack of licence, lack of supervision and lack of insurance do not directly determine the quality of driving, although they may aggravate the offence. Where the driving creates a substantial risk of danger but does not meet level 1, level 2 is appropriate. Serious aggravating features may still justify a substantial uplift within the level 2 range.

Following a jury trial at Chester Crown Court, the appellant was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in total. The principal sentence was nine years for causing death by dangerous driving, together with a consecutive sentence for further dangerous driving.

Leave to appeal against conviction was refused by the full court: [2023] EWCA Crim 1361. Permission to appeal against sentence was later granted: [2023] EWCA Crim 1335. The appeal concerned whether the brief period of driving before the fatal collision properly fell within level 1 of the applicable sentencing guideline and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

Appeal allowed to the extent of sentence. The sentence of nine years’ imprisonment on the principal count was quashed and replaced with one of six years. The other sentences remained in force, including the consecutive 12-month sentence for further dangerous driving. The total sentence was therefore reduced to seven years, and the extended disqualification period was reduced to 42 months.

1. The applicable causing-death-by-dangerous-driving guideline distinguished the three seriousness levels predominantly by factors relating to the standard of driving. The expression flagrant disregard for the rules of the road was to be understood by reference to the level 1 examples. Those examples included a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of very bad driving, substantial alcohol or drug consumption causing gross impairment, or a sufficiently serious group of determinants.

2. The evidence did not establish the level 1 characteristics. There was no excessive speed, no prolonged or persistent course of very bad driving, and the vehicle appeared similarly positioned to other vehicles travelling in the same direction. The appellant had moved too far into the opposing carriageway, but that brief feature did not by itself amount to level 1 driving. The finding that alcohol had been consumed, coupled with the finding that the appellant was not significantly impaired, meant that there was no gross impairment.

3. The appellant’s age, lack of driving licence, lack of supervision and lack of insurance did not directly concern the quality or standard of driving at the relevant time. They could affect the driving and could be treated as aggravating factors, but did not automatically elevate the offence to level 1. The appellant also had a reason to be partly in the opposing carriageway because parked vehicles had narrowed the road, although he had moved further over than necessary.

4. The guideline permitted a group of determinants, which individually or in smaller number would place an offence in a lower level, to move the offence to level 1 where the combination was sufficient. That threshold was not met. The driving instead created a substantial risk of danger and fell within level 2, carrying a starting point of five years’ custody and a range of four to seven years.

5. The sentencing judge’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors was upheld. A substantial uplift was justified, particularly by the very bad driving after the first collision, including driving with a shattered windscreen and continuing to place other road users at risk. Six years’ imprisonment for the principal count was just and proportionate.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the sentence appeal was allowed. The principal sentence was reduced from nine years to six years, producing a total sentence of seven years, under [2024] EWCA Crim 368. The earlier refusal of leave to appeal against conviction is recorded at [2023] EWCA Crim 1361, and permission to appeal against sentence at [2023] EWCA Crim 1335.
• Crown Court at Chester: following conviction after trial, the appellant was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in total, with an extended driving disqualification.