R v DCB

In sentencing historic sexual offences against children, harm may properly be placed in a higher guideline category where a combination of factors establishes particular vulnerability, even though no single factor is independently sufficient. Relevant factors may include the child’s young age, repeated offending, highly significant psychological harm and the absence of an available protective parent. That assessment does not double count abuse of trust where the factors perform distinct roles.

The totality principle is assessed against the seriousness of the offender’s overall criminality, not by comparing sentences for multiple offences and victims with the guideline range for one offence. Personal mitigation, including age, ill health and previous good character, must be balanced against serious persistent offending. A sentence that is severe is not necessarily manifestly excessive.

Following a jury trial at the Crown Court at Leicester, the appellant was convicted of historic sexual offences against his biological daughter and stepdaughter, committed when they were children. On 26 October 2023, he received an overall custodial term of 19 years and an extended licence period of one year.

With leave, he appealed against sentence. He argued that the principal rape should have been placed in a lower harm category, that the sentence breached the totality principle, and that insufficient allowance had been made for his age, health and previous good character. The central issues were whether the categorisation of harm and the resulting sentence were wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. The sentencing judge was entitled to place the rape of C1 in category 2A. Although the psychological harm was not severe enough by itself to constitute category 2 harm, it was highly significant. C1 was relatively young when the offending began and the first rape occurred. Her vulnerability was increased by the repeated pattern of offending and the absence of her mother, to whom she might otherwise have looked for protection. That last factor did not amount to double counting the abuse of trust.
2. The judge had carefully applied the approach in R v KC [2020] 1 Cr App R(S) 41 at [41]–[47], under which a combination or multiplicity of factors may justify a category 2 level of sentence where circumstances might technically fall within category 3, provided double counting is avoided. The judge also drew on R v DP [2022] EWCA Crim 57. No criticism could be made of that approach.
3. The totality principle was not breached. Comparing the sentence for multiple offences against two victims with the upper end of the guideline range for a single category 1A rape under section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 said nothing about totality. The true question was whether the sentences were just and proportionate to the seriousness of the overall criminality before mitigation. They were.
4. Previous good character attracted no significant weight for offending of this seriousness, particularly as the offending was persistent and there was no positive evidence of subsequent good character. The judge considered the appellant’s age and medical condition and reduced the sentence by two years. Those matters had to be balanced against the seriousness of the offending, and the allowance was not inadequate.
5. An appellate court does not interfere merely because a sentence is severe. The sentence was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against sentence on 11 April 2024, [2024] EWCA Crim 554.
• Crown Court at Leicester: following conviction after trial, sentenced the appellant on 26 October 2023 to an overall custodial term of 19 years and an extended licence period of one year.