R v Elvis Grant & Ors

In sentencing for murder, the aggravating factors listed in Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 are not exhaustive. The sentencing judge may take account of other features, including group offending, provided the assessment remains within the statutory framework and the facts. A finding of some planning does not require significant premeditation. In manslaughter cases, culpability must be placed within the applicable guideline by assessing the offender’s actual participation in the unlawful killing. A lesser role is not necessarily a minor role for guideline purposes. Consecutive sentences for related offending remain permissible where the judge has regard to totality.

Following a trial at the Central Criminal Court, Jamal Grant and Elvis Grant were convicted of murder and perverting the course of public justice. Lamar Grant was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter and perverting the course of public justice. The Recorder of London imposed life sentences with minimum terms of 24 years on Jamal and Elvis, and a total determinate sentence of 15 years on Lamar.

Jamal and Elvis renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence. Lamar appealed against sentence with permission. The central issues were whether the murder sentences gave excessive weight to aggravating factors and insufficient weight to the absence of an intention to kill, and whether Lamar’s role required a lower culpability category under the manslaughter guideline.

1. Jamal and Elvis Grant: The renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence were refused. The sentencing judge was entitled to treat the group nature of the offending as a significant aggravating feature. The attack involved the three offenders acting together while armed, and the judge had heard the evidence at trial.
2. The statutory aggravating factors in paragraph 9 of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 are expressly non-exhaustive. The judge was therefore not confined to paragraph 9 or to paragraphs 2(2), 3(2) and 4(2) when assessing culpability for murder. He was entitled to find some degree of planning without finding significant planning or premeditation.
3. The judge was also entitled to assess the other identified aggravating factors, including the risk to others and the public setting, and to give them appropriate weight. His downward adjustment for the single mitigating factor, the absence of an intention to kill, fell within the range open to him on the facts. There was no arguable ground of appeal.
4. Lamar Grant: His appeal against sentence was dismissed. The court upheld the conclusion that his culpability fell within category B of the manslaughter guideline. Although he did not inflict the fatal wound, he participated in an armed group attack, went with his father and brother to confront the deceased, and shared the motive of revenge. His role was more than minor in the sense used in category D.
5. The distinction between manslaughter and murder did not require a category D classification. The judge was entitled to rely on his assessment of the evidence, having presided over the trial, and to give appropriate weight to Lamar’s previous convictions and the other aggravating factors.
6. For the perverting the course of public justice offences, the sentences were properly treated as separate criminality. In Lamar’s case the judge was entitled to order the two-year sentence consecutively to the manslaughter sentence, having regard to totality.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): R v Elvis Grant & Ors [2024] EWCA Crim 603 — renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence by Jamal and Elvis were refused; Lamar’s appeal against sentence was dismissed.
• Central Criminal Court: The Recorder of London convicted Jamal and Elvis of murder and perverting the course of public justice, convicted Lamar of manslaughter and perverting the course of public justice, and sentenced them on 8 August 2023.