R v Marcus Taylor

An appellate court will not interfere with a sentencing judge’s findings of fact unless they are internally inconsistent, inconsistent with an uncontroverted fact, or irrational. A finding of severe psychological harm may be based on victim evidence and the sentencer’s observations; expert evidence is not required. Particular vulnerability may arise where personal circumstances materially limit a complainant’s ability to protest or escape. Whether conduct shows a significant degree of planning is a contextual factual assessment for the sentencing judge. In assessing totality, the age of a relevant previous conviction may reduce its weight, but factual similarity and concurrent offending may justify an uplift from the guideline starting point.

The appellant was convicted of rape, assault by penetration and sexual assault committed against a woman whom he had visited at her home on the ostensible basis of discussing a replacement car. The complainant’s children were asleep in the home during the offending.

On 29 September 2023, the sentencing judge imposed an extended sentence of 18 years for rape, comprising 12 years’ custody and a six-year extension period. Concurrent sentences were imposed for the other offences.

The appellant appealed on the basis that the sentence was manifestly excessive. He challenged the findings of severe psychological harm, particular vulnerability due to personal circumstances, and significant planning. He also contended that the sentence failed properly to reflect totality.

Appeal dismissed.

1. The court would not interfere with the sentencing judge’s factual findings unless they were internally inconsistent, inconsistent with an uncontroverted fact, or irrational. None of the challenged findings met that threshold.

2. The finding of severe psychological harm was open to the judge. The offence-specific guideline permits such a finding without expert evidence. The judge had the victim personal statements, which described panic attacks, anxiety and medication, and had observed the complainant give evidence.

3. The finding that the complainant was particularly vulnerable due to personal circumstances was also open to the judge. The presence of her children limited her ability to protest loudly or flee the flat. The judge could draw those inferences from the facts even though it was common ground that the complainant had not said that those matters had affected her thinking. The court considered R v Saunders [2022] EWCA Crim 264; [2022] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 36.

4. The judge was entitled to find a significant degree of planning from the appellant’s questions about when the children would be asleep, his persistence in visiting after the complainant tried to cancel because she was tired, and the absence of any earlier romantic involvement. Those matters could potentially have been neutral, but their significance was a factual assessment for the trial judge.

5. The two-year uplift from the 10-year rape starting point was not manifestly excessive. The earlier rape conviction was old, which reduced its effect, but its factual overlap with the present offending and the additional contemporaneous sexual offences were material aggravating features. The resulting 12-year custodial term, with the extension period, properly reflected the overall offending.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appellant’s appeal against sentence: [2024] EWCA Crim 615.
• Sentencing court — following convictions for rape, assault by penetration and sexual assault on 19 June 2023, imposed an extended sentence of 18 years on 29 September 2023. The court was not stated in the judgment.