R v Jing Du

For an offence under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 329(1)(a), the jury must consider separately whether the defendant acquired the property and whether she knew or suspected that it was criminal property. The latter question concerns the defendant’s state of knowledge at the relevant time, not what she knew by trial. A direction which blends these elements may render the conviction unsafe.

When extending time for a criminal appeal, the court must consider good reason, the interests of justice, the merits of the proposed grounds and any significant injustice resulting from refusal. Distinct periods of delay should be assessed according to their different causes and circumstances.

The appellant was convicted by a Crown Court jury, by a majority of 11 to 1, of acquiring criminal property contrary to section 329(1)(a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. She was acquitted of possessing criminal property and received a suspended sentence.

Her first proposed ground concerned fresh evidence in the form of threatening text messages. Her second ground alleged that the jury had not been directed to consider separately whether she acquired the funds and whether she knew or suspected that they were criminal property. The Single Judge refused leave on the first ground but referred the second ground and the application for a 363-day extension of time to the Full Court.

The central issues were whether the fresh evidence should be admitted, whether time should be extended, and whether the directions rendered the conviction unsafe.

1. Fresh evidence. Under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the Court applied the statutory factors governing receipt of evidence not adduced at trial. The threatening messages and supporting evidence were credible. There was a reasonable explanation for their omission at trial, including the absence of an available translation and the appellant’s accepted fear of those who had threatened her. The evidence was admitted for consideration of the extension application. The Court noted that section 23(2)(b) did not apply to the refused first ground, although the evidence supported the application for an extension.
2. Extension of time. The Court applied the principles in R v Hughes [2009] EWCA Crim 841 and R v Thorsby [2015] EWCA Crim 1. The relevant question was whether there was good reason to extend time and whether refusal would cause significant injustice, having regard to the interests of justice, the merits of the proposed ground and the effect of delay. The delay was assessed in two periods. The later period was substantially attributable to new solicitors and counsel obtaining instructions and records. The earlier period was attributable to the appellant but was understandable in light of the threats and circumstances accepted by the Court. The delay caused no difficulty in determining whether the directions were defective. Good reason and significant injustice were established.
3. Jury directions and safety. The Recorder’s directions were technically deficient. The jury had to be sure, separately, that the appellant had acquired the funds and that she knew or suspected at the relevant time that the property represented, directly or indirectly, the proceeds of criminal conduct. Her knowledge at trial could not substitute for the required state of knowledge at the time of the alleged offence. The conviction was therefore unsafe.
4. Disposition. Leave to appeal on Ground Two, the extension of time and the fresh-evidence applications were granted. The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed. The Crown did not seek a retrial, and there were no consequential orders.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2024] EWCA Crim 713, granted an extension of time, admitted fresh evidence, allowed the appeal on Ground Two and quashed the conviction. No retrial was ordered.
• Crown Court: On 16 June 2022, convicted the appellant by a majority of 11 to 1 of acquiring criminal property. On 16 September 2022, imposed an 18-month suspended sentence with 100 hours of unpaid work and a victim surcharge.