R v Duane Walker

A compensation order under the Sentencing Act 2020 requires personal injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence. A causal link between the offender’s conduct and the injury is therefore necessary, although strict tort or contract causation is not required. Participation in violent group offending does not, by itself, establish causation. Where an offender is sentenced on an accepted basis of plea that his direct actions caused no injury, and the pleaded conduct has no causal link to the victim’s injury, a compensation order is inappropriate and manifestly excessive.

The applicant pleaded guilty to affray on an accepted basis of plea which denied causing injury. The Crown Court at Chester imposed an 18-month community order and compensation orders of £1,000 to Jack Williams and £100 to Dale Kennerley. The applicant appealed against the compensation orders only, arguing that they lacked a causal foundation and were excessive. The central issues were whether compensation could be ordered for injuries caused during group violence where the applicant’s accepted conduct caused no injury, and whether the sums were properly assessed.

1. Appeal allowed. Leave to appeal was granted. The compensation orders were quashed.
2. Under section 133 of the Sentencing Act 2020, compensation must be for personal injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence or another offence taken into consideration. Section 134 makes a compensation order available where an offender is convicted. The court applied the causation principle in R v Stafford (Roy) Derby (1990) 12 Cr App R(S) 502: strict tort and contract causation is unnecessary, but evidence of causation between the offence and the injury is required.
3. As to Mr Williams, the applicant’s accepted plea established that he did not inflict injury. The injuries were encompassed in a separate section 47 assault count brought against Mr Dodd, who pleaded guilty on the full facts. There was no causal link between the applicant’s pleaded conduct and Mr Williams’s injuries. Any compensation order was therefore inappropriate and manifestly excessive.
4. As to Mr Kennerley, the court recognised that joint-enterprise violence causing injury may, in an appropriate case, justify compensation against one or more participants. It declined to formulate a general rule because the answer depends on the particular facts and any accepted basis of plea. On the facts here, the applicant’s accepted plea stated that his direct actions caused no injury, and the compensation order was consequently inappropriate and manifestly excessive.
5. Obiter guidance was given that the sentencing court must take the offender’s means into account and should obtain as much evidence as possible about the nature and extent of the injuries. The court should inquire into ability to pay and the timescale for payment, which may extend to three years.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The application for permission to appeal was referred to the Full Court. Permission was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the compensation orders were quashed: [2024] EWCA Crim 772.
• Crown Court at Chester: Following the applicant’s guilty plea to affray, the court imposed a community order and compensation orders of £1,000 to Jack Williams and £100 to Dale Kennerley.