Vanessa Jean Davies v Barbara Eleanor Watts & Anor

Testamentary capacity depends on the testator’s potential to understand the will, rather than perfect memory or physical health. The relevant inquiry is whether the testator understood the nature and effect of the act, the extent of the property, and the claims to which consideration was required, without mental disorder distorting judgment.

Where a will is duly executed and rational on its face, capacity is presumed unless a real doubt is raised. The evidential burden then shifts between the parties as the evidence requires. Knowledge and approval are assessed holistically. Proof that the testator gave instructions and that the will was read over will ordinarily suffice, subject to suspicious circumstances. The solicitor’s golden rule is guidance for avoiding disputes, not a rule of law.

Philip Price made a handwritten will on 14 December 2018, shortly after hospital treatment for pneumonia and possible sepsis. He left his farm, animals and residue to Vanessa Davies, appointing Mary Davies as executor and trustee.

Barbara Watts, Price’s previously unknown half-sister, challenged the will. She alleged that Price lacked testamentary capacity because of possible continuing delirium, and that he did not know or approve its contents. The court considered the medical and lay evidence, the circumstances in which the will was prepared, and whether the will’s terms accurately reflected Price’s instructions.

1. The claim succeeded and the counterclaim was dismissed. The will was admitted to probate in solemn form.
2. The governing capacity test was that the testator must understand the nature and effect of making a will, understand the extent of the property being disposed of, comprehend and appreciate the claims to which effect ought to be given, and be free from a disorder of the mind that poisoned affections, perverted the sense of right or prevented the exercise of natural faculties. The court applied the principles stated in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549.
3. Although the will was duly executed and rational on its face, the possible continuation of delirium and the medical evidence raised a real doubt. The court therefore did not rely on the presumption of capacity. It assessed the evidence as a whole, giving substantial weight to the solicitor’s account and to consistent evidence that Price remained mentally sharp despite severe physical frailty.
4. Capacity is a matter of potential understanding and is not equivalent to a test of memory. An understanding of collateral consequences is not required. The court applied the approach discussed in Simon v Byford [2014] EWCA Civ 280 and Hoff v Atherton [2004] EWCA Civ 1554.
5. The solicitor’s failure to obtain medical confirmation did not invalidate the will. The golden rule is a dispute-avoidance guide, not a legal requirement: Burns v Burns [2016] EWCA Civ 37. The court found that the solicitor had taken instructions, explained the draft, and allowed Price to read it before execution.
6. Price knew and approved the contents. The will was clear, written in capital letters on one page, and its terms were not complex. The court applied the holistic approach to knowledge and approval described in Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 and Symons.
7. The references to Price’s number of cousins and the ownership of two ponies did not establish incapacity or lack of knowledge and approval. The former was treated as a joke or emphasis, and the latter was an understandable oversight in the context of his illness.