Sarah Moakes v Canterbury City Council

A breach of a planning committee’s speaking procedure does not automatically invalidate the decision. The claimant must establish material prejudice. A council may restrict oral participation to maintain manageable meetings, but it must apply its own rules fairly and cannot read an unwritten restriction into a provision allowing three persons to speak for or against a proposal. In EIA cases, reasons must address the principal controversial issues and explain the decision intelligibly and adequately. Expert consultees’ views require considerable weight, but the decision-maker may disagree where the officer’s report gives adequate reasons. Previous planning decisions require comparison on material issues before consistency principles are engaged. Whether exceptional circumstances exist for major development in an AONB under paragraph 177 of the NPPF is a matter of planning judgment informed by the listed factors.

The claimant, a local resident, sought judicial review of Canterbury City Council’s grant of hybrid planning permission for a winery and warehousing in the Kent Downs AONB, near heritage assets and a conservation area. Four grounds were advanced: unfair or constitutionally unlawful restrictions on public speaking; inadequate treatment of expert consultees’ objections; failure to address a recent Medway appeal decision; and a materially misleading approach to the meaning of exceptional circumstances under paragraph 177 of the NPPF.

The court considered the Council’s constitution, the officer’s reports, the consultation responses, the Medway decision and the statutory and planning-policy framework.

1. Ground 1 failed. Appendix 1 of the Council’s constitution governed public speakers other than committee members and officers advising the committee. There was no basis for excluding statutory or publicly funded organisations from the category of public speakers. However, paragraph 3.3.1 contained no restriction to persons speaking only in a personal capacity. Representatives of organisations could use those slots. The Council therefore misled Natural England and CPRE Kent by suggesting that they could speak only as individuals. That was a breach of the constitution.
2. The breach did not establish material prejudice. The objections had been set out in written representations and summarised in the officer’s reports. The committee had also heard the substance of the AONB and Natural England objections. There was no evidence of what further points the claimant or the organisations would have made. The court rejected an automatic-unlawfulness approach and applied the requirement for material prejudice.
3. Ground 2 failed. The officer’s report adequately summarised and addressed the principal objections of Historic England, Natural England and the AONB Unit. It identified the heritage harm, the landscape effects, the need for the development, alternative sites, co-location benefits and the effect of existing development and proposed planting. The report gave sufficient reasons for departing from the consultees’ views.
4. Ground 3 failed. The Medway appeal was materially different. Its economic evidence and alternative-site assessment had been found inadequate, whereas the Council accepted the evidence supporting the present proposal and identified policy support for expansion. No separate reasons for distinguishing the Medway decision were required.
5. Ground 4 failed. Describing exceptional circumstances as a matter of planning judgment was legally correct. The officer’s report and presentation considered the factors in paragraph 177 of the NPPF and reached reasoned conclusions. The judicial review claim was dismissed.