Enreach UK Limited & Anor v Inreach Group Limited

Permission to appeal under CPR rule 52.6(1) requires a real prospect of success or another compelling reason. Where a statutory intellectual-property right is created subject to a regulatory scheme, applying that scheme does not ordinarily interfere with the right itself. A party cannot invoke property-rights protection to obtain rights wider than those acquired under the legislation governing registration. Hypothetical or speculative loss may be too remote to engage property rights. Policy considerations may properly inform proportionality where the claimant has placed the legislative policy in issue. Novelty alone is not a compelling reason for an appeal where the underlying claim has no real prospect of success. Summary determination is appropriate where the pleaded facts cannot establish the legal propositions relied upon.

The judgment concerned the claimants’ application for permission to appeal the judge’s earlier summary judgment in a trademark dispute. The earlier decision, reported as Enreach UK Limited and Another v Inreach Group Limited [2022] EWHC 2867 (Ch), rejected the claimants’ attempt to rely on Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 1 of the First Protocol to challenge the application of the Trade Marks (Relative Grounds) Order 2007.

The claimants alleged errors concerning victim status, hypothetical loss, proportionality, policy reasoning and the use of summary procedure. The central question was whether any ground had a real prospect of success or whether another compelling reason justified an appeal.

The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Property rights and the trademark scheme. A trademark is a statutory creation. The possession acquired on registration is the bundle of rights and limitations defined by the legislation then governing registration, including restrictions on who may challenge an earlier mark on relative grounds. Applying that scheme does not interfere with the registered proprietor’s possession. Disapplying it could instead expose the earlier proprietor to interference with its statutory rights.
2. Victim status and remoteness. The claimants had no real prospect of showing that applying the 2007 Order directly affected their possessions. The relevant rights were acquired after the Order took effect and were subject to its scheme. The possible loss relied on was hypothetical or speculative and therefore too remote. This was an additional ground; the earlier findings independently established that the claimants were not directly affected.
3. Justification and policy. The court was entitled to consider proportionality and the policy underlying the 2007 Order. It was not required to determine whether the legislative scheme was the best possible solution. The claimants identified no evidential basis for showing that the scheme was disproportionate or failed to serve the general interest.
4. Summary procedure. The legal case could be determined on the pleaded facts. Evidence concerning trademark similarity or alternative methods of achieving the Order’s aims was unnecessary because the pleaded legal propositions could not succeed even if the alleged facts were established. The case was therefore suitable for summary judgment.
5. Compelling reason. The novelty of the relationship between Article 1 of the First Protocol and trademark rights did not provide another compelling reason for an appeal. The dispute was private and no wider public-interest issue requiring appellate guidance was identified. Costs and the form of order were left for further submissions.

The application followed the earlier summary judgment in Enreach UK Limited and Another v Inreach Group Limited [2022] EWHC 2867 (Ch). The present court refused permission to appeal that judgment.