Amelia Miggiano v Islwyn Evans

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal merely seeks a different evaluation of factual evidence. An appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s findings of fact unless there is a material error of law, a critical finding unsupported by evidence, a misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a decision that cannot reasonably be explained or justified. The threshold for permission is whether the appeal has a real prospect of success or there is another compelling reason for it to be heard. A trial is not a rehearsal for a later factual hearing.

The claimant challenged the dismissal of her claim concerning the authenticity of a signature on a 2006 property transfer. After hearing evidence from the parties, the witnessing solicitor and a handwriting expert, the trial judge found that the signature was genuine and dismissed the claim.

The claimant applied for permission to appeal. She alleged errors in the evaluation of the evidence, deficiencies in her representation and unfairness in the conduct of the trial. The central question was whether the proposed appeal had a real prospect of success or another compelling reason for it to be heard.

1. Permission threshold. Under Civil Procedure Rules rule 52.7, permission could be granted only if the appeal had a real prospect of success or there was some other compelling reason for it to be heard. The court was considering permission, not rehearing the merits.
2. Appellate restraint. The principles in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, Henderson v Foxworth Investments Limited [2014] UKSC 41 and Fage UK Limited v Chobani Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 5 applied. An appellate court should not interfere merely because it might have reached a different conclusion. Intervention requires a plainly wrong decision or an identifiable error such as a material error of law, a critical finding without evidential basis, a demonstrable misunderstanding of evidence, or a failure to consider relevant evidence.
3. The trial judge’s conclusion was firmly rooted in the evidence. It was supported by the Will, contemporaneous correspondence, the solicitor’s evidence and the handwriting expert’s opinion. The judge was entitled to prefer the combined effect of that evidence over the claimant’s recollection.
4. The complaints about counsel, witness arrangements, documents and alleged dishonesty did not establish an unfair trial or an arguable error. The abandoned allegation of deceit could not be revived on appeal. The proposed appeal therefore had no real prospect of success and no other compelling reason had been shown.
5. Permission to appeal was refused under Civil Procedure Rules rule 52.6.

1. High Court (King’s Bench Division): Permission to appeal from the trial decision of His Honour Judge Jarman KC was refused. The court held that the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success and that no other compelling reason existed.