Richard Wood & Anor v Sophie Fleming

A course of conduct amounts to harassment where its volume, duration, targeting and manner cross the boundary from conduct that is unattractive or unreasonable into conduct that is oppressive and unacceptable. The assessment is objective, but must respect freedom of expression under article 10 ECHR and balance it against affected article 8 rights. A statutory defence based on preventing or detecting crime requires a subjective purpose, but fails where the conduct is irrational or perverse. In committal proceedings, the order and alleged breaches must be clear, the defendant must understand the order, and the breach must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The court may confine its findings to conduct that would breach a subsequently narrowed injunction, to ensure procedural fairness.

The claimants, an independent financial adviser and a solicitor, sued the defendant under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 after she repeatedly accused them online and in complaints to regulators, police, clients and others of fraud, criminality and professional misconduct. The court had previously granted an injunction and refused the defendant’s summary judgment application. At trial, the defendant did not attend but was represented and the court heard the claimants’ evidence tested in cross-examination. The court also considered alleged breaches of the injunction and the defendant’s related allegations against the claimants.

The central issues were whether the conduct constituted harassment, whether the statutory defence applied, and whether the alleged breaches of the injunction were proved to the criminal standard.

1. Harassment. The claimants proved a course of conduct extending over months and involving repeated online publications, complaints and communications. Applying the principles summarised in Hayden v Dickenson, McNally v Saunders and Sully v Mazur, the conduct was objectively oppressive and unacceptable. Its volume, duration and scattergun targeting of regulators, campaign groups, clients, suppliers, friends and family took it beyond ordinary irritation or upset.
2. The court balanced the claimants’ article 8 rights to private life and reputation against the defendant’s article 10 rights. The defendant’s allegations were unfounded, and the resulting interference with the claimants’ rights outweighed the defendant’s freedom of expression. The claimants’ harassment claim therefore succeeded.
3. The defence under section 1(3)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 did not apply. Although purpose is subjective, under Hayes v Willoughby a belief in preventing or detecting crime will not suffice if irrational or perverse. A targeted approach through appropriate regulators, police or court proceedings might potentially have fallen within the defence, but the defendant had instead spread unsupported allegations indiscriminately. The alternatives in section 1(3)(b) and (c) also failed.
4. Contempt. Applying Harris v Harris and the guidance in Supermax v Malhotra, the court was sure that the defendant had been personally served with, and understood, the injunction. The order was sufficiently clear, and the alleged breaches were unambiguous. Findings were limited to conduct that would also have breached the narrower terms later adopted, excluding the deleted prohibition on causing alarm or distress.
5. The defendant was therefore in partial breach of every entry in the Committal Notice, proved beyond reasonable doubt. Sentence was deferred. The injunction continued until further order. Nominal damages of £1 were awarded to each claimant. The defendant was ordered to pay the claimants’ costs on the indemnity basis, and permission to appeal in the injunction proceedings was refused.

Not stated in the judgment.