Robert Sully & Ors v Julia Mazur & Anor

For an interim harassment injunction, the court must predict whether the claimant is likely to establish at trial a course of conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable, objectively assessed in its full context. Individual communications may appear innocuous but form harassment when their persistence, repetition, manner and deployment together cross the criminal-liability threshold. The court must distinguish the substance of an underlying dispute from the oppressive manner in which allegations or demands are pursued. Where Convention rights are engaged, the restriction must satisfy Human Rights Act 1998 s.12(3), and freedom of expression must be given appropriate weight. Continuing conduct, delay, the adequacy of damages and the balance of convenience are relevant to the discretionary question. Significant factual disputes generally require determination under CPR Part 7 rather than Part 8.

The claimants, owners of a field adjoining the defendants’ property, alleged that the defendants had pursued them and associated persons through persistent correspondence concerning access, maintenance costs, a boundary fence, alleged criminal conduct, professional complaints and the proposed sale of adjoining property.

The claim was issued under CPR Part 8. The defendants disputed the procedural route, denied harassment and relied on reasonable conduct, delay, unclean hands and the balance of convenience. The claimants sought an interim injunction pending trial, restricting contact except through their solicitors. The central issues were whether the evidence showed a sufficient likelihood of harassment at trial, whether discretionary grounds justified refusal of relief, and whether the claim could fairly proceed under Part 8.

1. Interim injunction granted. The court was satisfied that the claimants were likely to establish at trial that the defendants had pursued a course of conduct amounting to harassment and had known, or ought to have known, that it did so. The court stressed that it was making a prediction on untested evidence rather than final findings of fact.
2. The relevant assessment was of the course of conduct as a whole. The defendants’ persistent direct contact despite requests to communicate through solicitors, repetitive and demanding correspondence, extravagant allegations of criminal and professional misconduct, communications with the third claimant’s employer and estate agents, and aggressive demands concerning maintenance costs were each capable of contributing to an oppressive course of conduct.
3. The court distinguished the merits of the underlying property disputes from the manner in which they were pursued. It was likely that the defendants had used allegations and communications to place pressure on the claimants, embarrass them professionally and interfere with their ability to deal with their property. The defence that the conduct was reasonable was therefore unlikely to succeed.
4. Because the injunction affected Article 10 rights, Human Rights Act 1998 s.12(3) required a likelihood that the claimants would obtain final relief. That threshold was met. Damages would not adequately compensate for continuing loss of peace of mind, delay did not justify refusal where the conduct was continuing, and the claimants’ alleged misconduct lacked the necessary immediate and necessary connection with the relief sought.
5. The claim could not fairly proceed under Part 8. The defendants were entitled to contest the context, purpose, frequency and effect of the correspondence, as well as causation and the extent of the claimants’ distress. Those significant factual disputes required a Part 7 trial and careful case management.