Predrag Stojcevic v County Court of Osijek, Croatia

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the passage of time alone rarely makes extradition oppressive. The court must focus on the consequences of the delay and the circumstances of the individual case. Unexplained and culpable delay may reduce the public interest in extradition, particularly where the requested person has established a settled family and personal life in the United Kingdom. Under section 21A, proportionality is assessed by balancing those interests against the public interest in extradition. A presumption that a European Union or Council of Europe state will comply with Convention standards may be displaced only by clear and compelling evidence. An appellate court may intervene where, after anxious consideration, the first-instance proportionality assessment was wrong.

The appellant challenged an extradition order made on 23 February 2023 on an accusation warrant issued by the County Court of Osijek. The allegations concerned participation in beatings and torture during the Yugoslav wars in 1991, charged under article 120(1) of the Croatian Basic Criminal Code.

He relied on section 14, section 21A and section 13(b) of the Extradition Act 2003. He also sought permission to add an article 3 ground based on alleged overcrowding in Croatian prisons. The central issues were whether delay made extradition unjust or oppressive, whether extradition would be a disproportionate interference with article 8 rights, whether nationality created a risk of prejudice, and whether the proposed prison-conditions ground had a realistic evidential basis.

The appeal was allowed on the section 21A ground and the warrant was discharged. The section 14 and section 13(b) grounds failed, and permission to amend to add the article 3 ground, together with permission to rely on supporting evidence, was refused.

1. Section 14. Applying the principles summarised in Barber and derived from Kakis and Gomes, the court held that “unjust” principally concerns the possibility of an unfair trial, while “oppressive” concerns hardship resulting from changes in the requested person’s circumstances. The standard is stringent. Delay itself is insufficient, and the focus is on its consequences rather than merely its cause. The evidence did not show that a fair trial would be impossible. Although there were substantial periods of unexplained delay, the disruption caused by extradition did not exceed significant hardship.
2. Article 8. The District Judge’s balance-sheet evaluation was wrong. The appeal did not turn on live evidence, so the appellate court could reconsider the evaluative conclusion under Re B. The delay after 2005, and particularly from 2011, was culpable because the requesting authority gave no convincing explanation. The allegations were serious, but the appellant was a 19-year-old conscript with no command position, and the authorities’ lack of attention reduced the strength of the public interest in extradition. Against that stood a well-established personal and family life in the United Kingdom over approximately 25 years. Applying the balance identified in Celinski, extradition would be disproportionate.
3. Nationality and prison conditions. The material concerning disproportionate prosecution or sentencing of ethnic Serbs did not establish the section 13(b) ground. The presumption that Croatia would comply with article 3 standards was not displaced. Vukusic concerned materially older prison conditions, and the evidence about Osijek prison lacked sufficient detail or compelling evidence of a real risk.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal against the extradition order made on 23 February 2023, discharged the warrant, dismissed the section 14 and section 13(b) grounds, and refused permission to add the article 3 ground.