Robert Karoly Hahn v Secretary of State for Justice

When deciding whether to accept a Parole Board recommendation to transfer an indeterminate-sentence prisoner to open conditions, the Secretary of State must engage genuinely with the recommendation and give a rational explanation for any different conclusion. The decision letter must be read as a whole, but it must accurately address the Board’s reasoning. The required intensity of reasoning lies on a continuum: disagreements closely connected with past facts require more cogent explanation, while predictive or policy judgments require less detailed reasoning. A decision based on misreading the recommendation, treating unavailable interventions as available, or asserting that open-estate behaviours can be demonstrated in closed conditions is unlawful. The high threshold in section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 is not met where the underlying assessment, rather than merely the drafting, was flawed.

The claimant, a life prisoner detained in a Category C establishment, challenged the Secretary of State’s decision rejecting the Parole Board’s recommendation that he be transferred to open conditions. The decision was made under the applicable version of the Generic Parole Process Policy Framework. The claimant alleged inadequate reasons and irrationality. The Secretary of State contended that the decision rationally addressed the recommendation and that relief was barred because the outcome would highly likely have been the same under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The central issues were whether the decision properly engaged with the Parole Board’s assessment and whether the statutory threshold for refusing relief was satisfied.

Claim succeeded. The decision was quashed, with fresh consideration required.

1. Applicable framework. Under the version of the Generic Parole Process Policy Framework in force, the default position was that a Parole Board recommendation would not be accepted unless the specified acceptance criteria were met. The three relevant criteria were low risk of absconding, an essential period in open conditions to inform future release decisions and preparation for release, and no undermining of public confidence.
2. The Secretary of State remained the primary decision-maker. The Parole Board’s recommendation had to be properly considered, but the Secretary of State could reach a different rational conclusion. The court had to assess the rationality of the Secretary of State’s decision, not the rationality of the Board’s recommendation. The approach in R (Overton) v Secretary of State for Justice [2023] EWHC 3071 (Admin), refined in light of R (Cain) v Secretary of State for Justice [2024] EWHC 426 (Admin) and R (Uddin) v Secretary of State for Justice [2024] EWHC 696 (Admin), remained applicable.
3. Reasons and engagement. A decision letter had to be read fairly, realistically and as a whole. It did not require a point-by-point rebuttal, but it had to show why the Secretary of State disagreed with the Board and demonstrate proper engagement. The necessary detail depended on the issue. More cogent reasoning was required where the disagreement concerned past facts or matters on which the Board had a particular advantage. Less intense reasoning could suffice for predictive or policy judgments, though reasons were still required.
4. The decision misread or misunderstood the Board’s reasoning. It treated open-estate testing, freer access to alcohol and contraband, staged reintegration and employment opportunities as behaviours capable of being demonstrated in the closed estate. It also appeared to treat post-release controls as controls required in open conditions, without explaining their relevance to the transfer decision. The decision did not engage with the Board’s conclusion that professional scepticism about the claimant’s account could coexist with safe management in open conditions.
5. The decision also relied on alternative interventions without addressing evidence that those interventions were unlikely to be available. If further work in closed conditions was relied upon, the decision needed to explain whether that work could in fact be undertaken and why its absence nevertheless weighed against transfer.
6. Section 31(2A). The high hurdle for refusing relief was not met. The flaws affected the underlying assessment, rather than merely the expression of an otherwise rational conclusion. The Parole Board had already considered the claimant’s lack of honesty and nevertheless recommended transfer. It could not be said that proper engagement with the recommendation would highly likely have produced the same outcome.