Lidl Great Britain Limited v East Lindsey District Council

In planning decisions, a comparison with an alternative scheme is not ordinarily mandatory. It becomes a mandatory material consideration where the particular facts make the comparison so obviously material that omitting it would be irrational. That may occur where rival applications compete for finite capacity and granting both would cause significant planning harm.

The decision-maker must address the competing merits coherently. Administrative convenience, the fact that one application is ready first, or the existence of a separate sequential-test exercise does not justify ignoring an obviously material rival proposal.

Lidl challenged the Council’s grant of planning permission to Aldi for an out-of-centre foodstore in Horncastle. Both Lidl and Aldi had applications for discount supermarkets. The retail evidence accepted by the Council indicated that either store alone would not cause a significant adverse impact on the town centre, but that both stores together would do so.

The Council determined Aldi’s application first. It treated the cumulative impact of both schemes as a material consideration but gave it little weight because Lidl’s application was not yet ready for determination. Lidl argued that the Council had unlawfully failed to compare the rival schemes and had acted unfairly in determining Aldi’s application separately.

The central issue was whether, on these facts, comparison of the two proposals was an obviously material consideration requiring direct consideration.

1. The claim succeeded and the planning permission was quashed. The Council’s own analysis showed that Aldi alone would have some adverse impact on the town centre, although not a significant adverse impact, while both stores together would risk significant adverse impact.
2. The two applications were realistically competing for the finite capacity for one out-of-centre supermarket without significant harm to the vitality and viability of Horncastle town centre. In those circumstances, a comparison of their relative merits was so obviously material that it required direct consideration. This was consistent with the approach in GLC v Secretary of State for the Environment, Secretary of State v Edwards and R (Chelmsford Car and Commercial Ltd) v Chelmsford, while the court declined to create a rigid special category of rival cases.
3. The requirement arose from the particular facts. It was not confined to the sequential-test stage of retail policy. The fact that the Aldi application was ready first, that the Lidl addendum was awaited, or that determining both applications together would have been administratively easier did not justify omitting the comparison.
4. The Council’s approach effectively gave priority to the first application and disclosed no principled method for choosing between the schemes. It therefore contained a logical gap and was irrational in the sense identified in R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, ex parte Balchin.
5. The fairness ground was parasitic on the successful first ground. The applications did not necessarily have to be determined at the same meeting, but a lawful comparison was required.