One Trees Estates Limited, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A sponsor’s breach of mandatory sponsorship requirements does not remove the Secretary of State’s residual discretion, but the discretion need not be addressed expressly where no particular reason for exercising it, beyond matters already covered by the Guidance, is advanced. In deciding whether to revoke a sponsor licence, the Secretary of State is not generally required to undertake a detailed global assessment of the commercial consequences for the sponsor, its workers, service users or the wider care sector. The decision must be read fairly and as a whole, with due respect given to the Secretary of State’s immigration-control expertise. Relief may also be refused where it is highly likely that the outcome would have been substantially the same under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

The claimant, a nursing-care provider, challenged the revocation of its sponsor licence. The Secretary of State concluded that six sponsored workers were performing carer duties rather than the senior-care-worker duties stated on their Certificates of Sponsorship, so that the vacancies were not genuine under the sponsor Guidance.

Permission was granted on one ground only: whether the Secretary of State had made a material public law error by failing to conduct an adequately reasoned global assessment of all relevant considerations, including the effects of revocation on the business, workers, residents and the wider care sector. The court also determined an application to admit late evidence.

1. The Secretary of State’s late witness statement was excluded. The breach of the case-management order was serious and lacked a good explanation. Applying the Denton v TH White Ltd criteria, the court considered all the circumstances, including the absence of disruption to the hearing and the fact that the evidence would not alter the substantive outcome.

2. The claimant accepted that the established breach fell within the mandatory revocation provisions of the Guidance. Those provisions did not, however, eliminate the Secretary of State’s residual discretion. In the absence of a particular reason to exercise that discretion which was not already factored into the Guidance, there was no obligation to address or give reasons for not exercising it.

3. The court approved the principles summarised in R (on the application of St Andrew’s College) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, including that sponsorship is a privilege carrying substantial responsibility, that the Secretary of State may act on a fairly high index of suspicion and with a light trigger, and that the court’s role is supervisory. Due respect had to be given to the Secretary of State’s experience and expertise in immigration control.

4. The court declined to follow the approach in Supporting Care Ltd v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SCL”), which had required an adequately reasoned global assessment of the wider impacts of revocation. It treated R (Prestwick Care Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department as answering the complaint: the Secretary of State was not required to assess the commercial impact on the sponsor or the effects on care and health services. The revocation decision had to be considered in context and as a whole.

5. The Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the breach was serious and that downgrading was inappropriate. The decision-maker was not required to assess the consequences for the claimant’s business, employees, service users or the wider social-care sector. In any event, under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, it was highly likely that the outcome would have been the same even if a fuller global assessment had been required.

6. The judicial review claim was dismissed. The parties were directed to seek agreement on an order dealing with the judgment and consequential costs.

Not an appeal. The judgment records that permission for judicial review was initially refused on all four grounds, but permission was granted on renewal for one ground only.