New Hope Care Limited, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A sponsor-licence revocation decision must comply with procedural fairness, including the Secretary of State’s published procedure and any clear procedural promise made to the sponsor. The seriousness of alleged non-compliance, or the existence of a ground described as requiring revocation, does not automatically dispense with an opportunity to respond. The requirement that an authorising officer be “based in” the UK is fact-sensitive. Temporary absence does not necessarily defeat that requirement, but prolonged, repeated or indefinite absence may do so when assessed in context. The Secretary of State may make a proportionate global assessment of the seriousness of breaches and their consequences, but need not investigate the precise effects of revocation on every affected person or the wider care economy.

The claimant, a care-services provider, challenged the defendant’s decision of 6 October 2023 to revoke its sponsor licence. The claimant alleged irrationality, misdirection as to the Guidance requirement that its authorising officer be “based in” the UK, procedural unfairness, and failure to conduct a global assessment of the consequences of revocation.

The defendant relied on the authorising officer’s absence overseas, alleged failures concerning sponsorship certificates, pay, contracts, delayed starts, right-to-work checks and record-keeping, and argued that revocation was either mandatory or highly likely regardless of any procedural defect. Permission was granted on all four grounds.

1. Grounds 1 and 2 failed. The description of several attempted visits was inaccurate, but the wording appeared in an introductory paragraph and was not an operative reason for revocation. Describing the authorising officer’s absence as indefinite was permissible because there was no known end-point. The requirement to be “based in” the UK was fact-sensitive: absence did not automatically defeat it, but prolonged, repeated or indefinite absence could. The defendant was entitled to consider the duration and reasons for the absence, the absence of another person able to perform the role, and the lack of a return date.
2. Ground 3 succeeded. The Guidance required the defendant to give reasons for suspension, allow 20 working days for written representations and evidence, and consider the response. Those requirements were not displaced merely because a ground within Annex C1 was alleged. The Guidance had to be interpreted against the common law right to a reasonable opportunity to know the allegations and answer them. The suspension letter also created a clear and unambiguous procedural promise, giving rise to a legitimate expectation.
3. The defendant had no evidential basis for a good reason to depart from the Guidance or to resile from its promise. The seriousness of the concerns and the claimant’s failure to keep the defendant adequately informed did not justify moving directly from suspension to immediate revocation without providing a written summary of the concerns and a reasonable opportunity to respond. The common law duty of fairness was independently breached.
4. The procedural defects were material. It was not highly likely or inevitable that revocation would have followed a fair process, since the claimant might have addressed the alleged breaches, mitigation and the proportionality of revocation.
5. Ground 4 failed. The court followed the approach in Prestwick Care Limited and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 3193 (Admin) and declined to follow Supporting Care Ltd v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWHC 68 (Admin). A proportionate overall assessment may be required, but the defendant need not make precise findings about the impact on individual care recipients, workers, families or the wider care economy.
6. The claim was granted. The revocation decision was quashed and the defendant was ordered to pay the claimant’s reasonable costs on the standard basis.