R (TJ Trading Express Limited) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A sponsor licence may be revoked immediately under published guidance, but that power remains subject to common-law procedural fairness. Where revocation will significantly affect the sponsor, the sponsor ordinarily must receive a fair opportunity to address the suspected breaches and any relevant mitigation.

The exception for cases in which representations would be pointless is narrow. It concerns circumstances such as urgency or practical impossibility, not the decision-maker’s unilateral assessment that the evidence is strong.

An allegation that a sponsor assigned a certificate of sponsorship to a close relative, failed to disclose that relationship, and thereby created a sham vacancy may amount to reprehensible, bad-faith or disreputable conduct. A conclusion that a vacancy is not genuine must address deliberate conduct or dishonesty and provide adequate reasons.

The claimant operated a petrol station and convenience store under a skilled-worker sponsor licence. The Secretary of State revoked the licence immediately after the claimant’s director assigned a Certificate of Sponsorship to his brother-in-law and failed to disclose the relationship.

The claimant sought judicial review, pursuing arguments that the decision was procedurally unfair because no opportunity to make representations had been given, and that the Secretary of State had unlawfully concluded that the vacancy was not genuine. The Secretary of State relied on mandatory revocation grounds concerning sponsorship of a close relative and non-genuine vacancies, and argued that any errors were immaterial under common-law principles and section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

1. Ground 1 succeeded. The common-law rule in Bank Mellat and Balajigari required an opportunity to make representations before revocation. The fact that the Guidance permitted immediate revocation without warning did not displace that duty. The Guidance had to be interpreted against the common law.
2. The sponsorship context permits a high index of suspicion and a light trigger for protective action, but it does not dilute basic procedural fairness. Representations about whether a suspected breach occurred and what sanction was appropriate were distinct from representations about the wider impact of revocation.
3. The allegation under ground (o) was capable of amounting to dishonesty, bad faith or other reprehensible or disreputable conduct. The rule in Balajigari therefore applied even if the conduct was not characterised as dishonesty.
4. The claimed pointlessness exception did not apply. “Pointless” concerned the circumstances and practical operation of the decision-making process, particularly urgency, impossibility or impracticality. It did not permit the decision-maker to dispense with representations merely because the evidence appeared compelling.
5. Ground 3 succeeded. The Secretary of State had not demonstrated that the correct question under ground (z) had been asked, namely whether there was evidence of deliberate or dishonest conduct. The matters relied on required explanation but did not themselves justify an immediate conclusion that the vacancy was sham or created primarily to facilitate immigration.
6. The decision was inadequately reasoned on a principal controversial issue. The letter did not explain how the assignment to a relative and failure to make a sponsor note established deliberate conduct or dishonesty.
7. The materiality and section 31(2A) arguments failed. The court could not conclude that revocation was inevitable or highly likely because representations might have affected the findings, mitigation and sanction. The decision of 6 March 2024 was quashed.