Manori Balachandra v The General Dental Council

On a statutory appeal from a professional disciplinary committee, the court conducts a rehearing by reanalysis of the evidence, rather than a full rehearing of live testimony. It may correct material errors of fact and law and draw justified factual inferences, while remaining cautious about credibility findings.

A finding of dishonest retrospective record-making requires sufficient evidence and adequate reasoning. Unusual format, prose style, repetition, or comprehensive content do not by themselves prove fraud, particularly where original documents have been lost and comparable records have not been investigated. Loss of evidence does not automatically require a stay, but the court must assess whether a fair hearing remains possible and give the loss appropriate weight.

The claimant, a dentist, appealed under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 against findings by the General Dental Council’s Professional Conduct Committee that she had dishonestly created and submitted retrospective handwritten clinical records for 11 patients. The committee erased her from the register and imposed immediate suspension.

The claimant challenged the refusal to stay the proceedings following the loss or destruction of original records, the factual findings concerning the handwritten records, and the sanction. The central questions were whether the committee had sufficient evidence and adequate reasons to find dishonest backdating, and what orders should follow.

1. Appeal and statutory powers. The appeal was allowed in relation to the handwritten Brown Card findings. The court set aside the findings on charges 1–11, 16, 17, the parts of charge 21 concerning the cards, and charges 22–24. The case was remitted to the Professional Conduct Committee for reconsideration of sanction.
2. Nature of the appeal. Under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 and CPR Part 52, the appeal was by way of rehearing through reanalysis of the transcript and documentary evidence. The court could correct material errors of fact and law and draw justified factual inferences. It nevertheless had to exercise caution before disturbing primary findings dependent on credibility.
3. Stay and abuse of process. The loss of original records did not automatically require a stay. The claimant had to show prejudice and that a fair hearing could not be held. That threshold was not met. Although the loss deprived her of the opportunity to obtain handwriting and document-authenticity evidence and complicated the hearing, a reasonably fair hearing remained possible if the evidential deficiencies were given proper weight.
4. Dishonesty findings. The committee had insufficient evidence to infer that no Brown Cards existed in 2017. The scanning process was incomplete and undocumented, no relevant scanning witness was called, and the original records had been lost or destroyed. The experts were not experts in handwriting or document authenticity. Their observations about prose, headings, gaps, repetition, unusual format and content addressing identified record-keeping criticisms could establish unusualness, but not fraud. The committee also failed to engage with material explanations, comparable records, the termination of the NHSE investigation without disciplinary action, and the evidential consequences of the lost originals.
5. Second alleged fraud. The committee failed to identify when the later cards were created, how they reached the claimant’s solicitors, or why the undisputed evidence concerning copies held since 2019 did not assist the claimant. It also failed to apply the relevant dishonesty test in Ivey v Genting. The findings were therefore unsupported by sufficient evidence and procedurally unjust because of inadequate reasoning.
6. Sanction and suspension. Since the most serious findings were set aside, sanction had to be reconsidered. The immediate suspension ceased on determination of the appeal. In any event, it was terminated on hand-down, having regard to the claimant’s reasonably safe practice over the preceding seven years.

The judgment does not state a prior appellate decision. It records an appeal under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 from findings and sanction imposed by the General Dental Council’s Professional Conduct Committee.