Mohsen Mobasseri v General Dental Council

On a statutory appeal from a professional disciplinary tribunal, the High Court should rarely interfere with primary factual findings, but must intervene where the tribunal reverses the burden of proof or fails to address material evidence.

A finding of dishonesty cannot rest merely on the absence of an innocent explanation. The regulator must prove the relevant state of mind and dishonesty on the balance of probabilities. A tribunal must address evidence that the conduct may have resulted from error and evidence negating financial motive where those matters bear on the alleged dishonesty.

Erasure is not inevitable following dishonesty. However, repeated and concealed falsification of patient records, misleading a regulator, persistent lack of insight and serious professional failings may make erasure necessary to protect the public and maintain confidence in the profession.

Mr Mohsen Mobasseri appealed under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 against findings and sanction imposed by a Professional Conduct Committee of the Dental Professional Hearings Service. The Committee found multiple clinical and record-keeping failings, dishonesty in retrospective alteration of patient records and dishonesty in inappropriate NHS claims. It erased his name from the Dental Register.

The appeal challenged findings concerning basic periodontal examinations, treatment planning, several NHS claims and the sanction of erasure. The central issues were whether the Committee had made factual or legal errors, including by reversing the burden of proof in relation to dishonesty, and whether erasure remained proportionate after some findings were set aside.

1. Approach to the appeal. Under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 and CPR rule 52.21(3), the High Court could allow the appeal if the Committee’s decision was wrong or unjust because of serious procedural irregularity. It should show substantial deference to primary factual findings, particularly where the tribunal had heard the witnesses. Specialist tribunal decisions should be read as a whole.
2. Clinical findings. The Committee was entitled to find that the appellant had not undertaken basic periodontal examinations for the relevant patients. The absence of contemporaneous scores, the dental nurse’s evidence, the appellant’s own account of his usual practice and his dismissive attitude to the clinical importance of such examinations supported that conclusion. The Committee was also entitled to find that there was evidence of periodontal disease in two patients. Although it made an error concerning one radiograph, other evidence, including scans and the appellant’s own explanations, supported the finding.
3. Dishonesty and burden of proof. The Committee correctly identified the Ivey approach, but its reasoning concerning Patients B, F and K in practice reversed the burden of proof. It treated deliberate manipulation as its starting point, required the appellant to provide an explanation for the changes and failed expressly to assess administrative error. It also failed to address unchallenged evidence that the practice was not near the contractual clawback threshold and that the appellant therefore lacked a financial motive. Those dishonesty findings were set aside.
4. The reasoning concerning Patients C and D was also insufficient. The Committee failed to address the appellant’s evidence that he believed repeat claims would not be paid, which was relevant to his state of mind and removed the central basis for inferring financial gain. The dishonesty findings in respect of those patients were set aside.
5. The finding concerning Patient I was different. The Committee did not reverse the burden of proof. It was entitled to prefer the contemporaneous record over the appellant’s later account and to find that the treatment was not a separate emergency appointment. The appeal on that issue failed.
6. Sanction. The Committee had properly considered the relevant guidance, remediation, testimonials and mitigating factors. Erasure was not inevitable merely because dishonesty was established, but the appellant’s repeated retrospective falsification of numerous patient records, including to mislead the NHS, his dishonest emergency claim, serious clinical failings and incomplete insight justified erasure. The sanction was neither excessive nor disproportionate.
7. The appeal was allowed only in respect of the dishonesty findings concerning Patients B, C, D, F and K. Otherwise it was dismissed, and the direction erasing the appellant’s name from the Register stood.

• Professional Conduct Committee of the Dental Professional Hearings Service: found misconduct, impairment of fitness to practise and directed erasure from the Dental Register on 13 December 2024.
• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal in part by setting aside dishonesty findings concerning Patients B, C, D, F and K. Otherwise the appeal was dismissed and erasure was upheld.