Timothy John Hull Pattinson v Robert Ian Winsor

Harassment may be pursued through publication to third parties and does not require direct communication with the target. Truth is not, by itself, a defence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; the manner, persistence and audience of communications remain material.

The statutory defence for conduct pursued to prevent or detect crime requires more than a subjective belief. The defendant must have rationally assessed the material suggesting criminality and the appropriateness of the conduct. Summary judgment may be given where the evidence establishes that the defendant has no realistic prospect of defending the claim and there is no reasonable prospect that a trial would alter the position.

The claimant, a District Judge, brought a claim under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 concerning emails sent by the defendant, his brother-in-law. The emails alleged serious criminal and professional misconduct and were copied to judicial colleagues, officials and others likely to bring them to the claimant’s attention.

An interim injunction had previously been granted. The claimant applied for summary judgment and a final injunction. The defendant did not attend the hearing. The issues included the effect of commencing the claim under CPR Part 8, whether the communications constituted harassment, whether truth or the crime-prevention defence was available, and whether the claim could properly be determined summarily.

1. Procedure. The claim should have been commenced under CPR Part 7 because the relief extended to publication through the media, online or in speech. The use of Part 8 meant that there was no statement of case or defence capable of being struck out under CPR 3.4(2). The application therefore proceeded, if at all, under CPR Part 24. The procedural error caused no unfairness because the claimant’s evidence identified the communications in detail and the defendant had ample opportunity to respond.
2. Summary judgment. Applying the approach in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd and Duchess of Sussex v Associated Newspapers Ltd, the defendant had no realistic prospect of defending the claim. The court could decide the matter without a trial because the evidence was sufficient and there was no identified material likely to emerge at trial.
3. Harassment. The emails constituted one or, alternatively, two courses of conduct. Communications about the claimant, sent to his solicitor and professional contacts likely to draw them to his attention, were capable of targeting him even though they were not sent directly to him. Their persistence, deliberateness, oppressive character, choice of recipients, repetition and extravagant allegations were plainly capable of amounting to harassment and of causing alarm and distress.
4. Defences and rights. Truth was not a defence. Even well-founded allegations may amount to harassment when communicated by relentless, scatter-gun repetition to inappropriate recipients. Any genuine concern should have been reported through proper channels. Article 10 rights attracted little weight because the defendant had no realistic prospect of establishing allegations that were true or worthy of investigation.
5. The defence under section 1(3)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 also had no realistic prospect. Under Hayes v Willoughby, a subjective belief is insufficient; there must be a rational connection between the conduct and the prevention or detection of crime. No such connection existed.
6. The court granted summary judgment, made a final injunction in substantially the terms of the interim injunction, and awarded indemnity costs. The contempt application was left for later determination.

The judgment records earlier interim injunction decisions in the same proceedings: [2024] EWHC 230 and [2024] EWHC 606. This was a first-instance determination of the claimant’s application for summary judgment and a final injunction.