Travelers Insurance Company Limited & Ors v Andrew Baldwin

A persistent and deliberate course of oppressive conduct may constitute harassment even where the defendant alleges that the underlying allegations are true. Truth is not, by itself, a defence where the conduct involves relentless and threatening communications, visits or publication threats.

A defence must engage with the pleaded allegations and comply with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. A litigant in person is subject to the same procedural requirements as a represented party. Where no coherent defence is disclosed and the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim, the court may strike out the defence and give summary judgment. A permanent injunction may be granted where it is necessary and proportionate to prevent further harassment.

The claimants, an insurer and two solicitors’ firms, brought a claim under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 concerning the defendant’s escalating emails, threats, allegations of fraud, attendance at offices and demands for money.

The defendant relied principally on an underlying dispute concerning his daughter’s former retainer with one of the firms and alleged fraud in the relevant documents. He applied to stay or discharge the proceedings and sought a separate trial of the fraud allegations.

The claimants applied to strike out the defence, obtain summary judgment and secure a permanent injunction. The central issues were whether the defence complied with the procedural rules, whether the pleaded conduct amounted to harassment, and whether the underlying fraud allegations provided any defence.

1. Defence struck out. The documents relied on as defences did not address the pleaded acts said to constitute harassment. They instead repeated allegations concerning the underlying dispute. The requirements of CPR 16.5 and CPR PD53B were substantive requirements, not mere technicalities. A litigant in person remained subject to them: Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12.
2. The pleaded defence was also unreasonably vague and incoherent, and therefore amounted to an abuse of the court’s process likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings within CPR 3.4(2)(b). The defect could not realistically be remedied by further pleading: Towler v Wills [2010] EWHC 1209 (Comm).
3. Summary judgment granted. Applying the approach in Easyair Ltd (trading as Openair) v Opal Telecom [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch), the claimants had a realistic prospect of success and the defendant had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim. The evidence established a persistent, deliberate and oppressive course of conduct which went well beyond ordinary irritation or upset. It caused alarm, fear or distress and satisfied the general description of harassment in Hayden v Dickenson [2020] EWHC 3291 (QB).
4. The fact that a company or LLP may seek an injunction to protect individuals from harassment was recognised by Merlin Entertainments PLC v Cave [2014] EWHC 3036 (QB); [2015] EMLR 3 and Foot Anstey LLP v Stimson [2024] EWHC 2621 (KB). The alleged fraud and the authenticity of the signature or emails in the underlying dispute were not relevant to the harassment claim.
5. Truth was not a defence to the course of conduct relied on. Even truthful allegations may form part of harassment where they are communicated through persistent, oppressive or threatening conduct. The same principle was stated in Merlin Entertainments and Pattinson v Winsor [2024] EWHC 1910 (KB).
6. The defendant’s applications to stay or discharge the proceedings, and for a separate fraud hearing, were totally without merit. A permanent injunction was necessary and proportionate, having regard to freedom of expression and section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

The judgment records that an interim injunction was granted by Jay J on 5 March 2025. Garnham J dismissed the defendant’s application to discharge it on 6 May 2025. Applications considered by Master Gidden and Steyn J were also unsuccessful. Lewison LJ refused permission to appeal on 27 October 2025.