Richard Achille v Philip Calcutt & Anor

A civil restraint order is justified where a litigant has persistently issued claims or made applications certified as totally without merit. Earlier findings are not erased when a previous order expires, and the later court should not reopen them unless they have been disturbed on appeal. The court must then consider all the circumstances, including persistence, previous warnings, lack of insight, likely prejudice to others and proportionality. An extended order is appropriate for obsessive litigation concerning one connected subject, whereas a general order is reserved for a scattergun approach across unrelated grievances. A civil restraint order is an additional permission filter, not an absolute bar to litigation. Upfront court fees may be a legitimate deterrent where the evidence does not establish an effective bar to access to justice.

The claimant brought contempt proceedings against the defendants arising from earlier disputes connected with events at Moseley Tennis Club in 2014. On 19 February 2024 the court refused permission to bring the contempt proceedings and certified both them and the permission application as totally without merit.

At the subsequent hearing, the court considered whether the claimant’s history of thirteen such findings, two earlier civil restraint orders and continued litigation justified a further order. It also determined the costs of the unsuccessful contempt proceedings, including the claimant’s reliance on qualified one-way costs shifting.

1. Threshold. Rule 3.11 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and Practice Direction 3C provide limited, extended and general civil restraint orders. A limited order addresses repeated totally without merit applications in one set of proceedings. An extended order addresses persistent claims or applications concerning, or connected with, the proceedings. A general order is appropriate where an extended order would be insufficient or inappropriate, including a scattergun approach across different grievances.
2. The thirteen previous certifications established persistence. The court was not entitled to reconsider whether those claims and applications had been totally without merit. The earlier findings remained relevant notwithstanding the expiry of the previous orders, and later unmeritorious conduct could justify prompt further action.
3. Once the threshold was met, the court had to consider all the circumstances, including the claimant’s lack of insight, previous warnings and orders, the continuing campaign of litigation, prejudice to opponents and other court users, and whether the proposed restraint was necessary and proportionate.
4. The claimant’s Article 6 argument failed. A civil restraint order does not wholly prohibit litigation; it requires prior judicial permission. Although the Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008 required the permission fee to be paid upfront despite possible fee remission, the evidence did not show that the fee was an effective bar. The fee and the risk of non-refund were legitimate disciplines on persistently vexatious litigation.
5. A limited order would have little practical effect, while a general order was excessive because the claimant’s litigation was principally obsessive and connected with the tennis-club events rather than genuinely scattergun. An extended civil restraint order for three years was therefore necessary and appropriate.
6. The defendants were wholly successful in the separate contempt proceedings. The claimant was ordered to pay their costs on the standard basis, including the strike-out and adjournment applications, with detailed assessment if necessary and a payment on account of £30,000. The qualified one-way costs shifting rules did not apply because the proceedings were a separate Part 8 claim, not personal injury proceedings.