Jonathan Bishop v The Student Loans Company Ltd (No.2)

A civil restraint order does not generally prevent access to justice. It imposes a time-limited permission filter on further claims or applications by a litigant who persists in pursuing litigation that is totally without merit. A modest fee for seeking permission may be a legitimate and proportionate deterrent, particularly where there is no evidence that payment would prevent access to justice. The existence of some successful claims does not preclude restraint where other litigation has been totally without merit. The court may make a general order where the litigant’s conduct concerns diverse claims against different defendants and a limited or extended order would not provide an adequate control.

The claimant applied to set aside a three-year general civil restraint order made after the dismissal of interim-relief applications certified as totally without merit. The order had been made without a further hearing, but the claimant was permitted to apply to set it aside, vary or stay it.

The claimant sought to reargue the interim-relief applications, relied on a history of successful litigation, alleged that the order was oppressive and discriminatory, and argued that it was disproportionate. The central issues were whether the earlier findings could be reopened on this application, whether the permission fee denied access to justice, and whether a more limited form of restraint was appropriate.

1. The application was dismissed. It was again totally without merit, although the court declined to make any further civil restraint order.
2. The claimant could not use an application to set aside the civil restraint order to reargue the underlying interim-relief applications or challenge the finding that they were totally without merit. Those matters might be pursued by appeal, but were not open on this application: Crimson Flower Productions Ltd v Glass Slipper Ltd [2020] EWHC 942 (Ch); Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset v Gray [2019] EWCA Civ 1675; and Achille v Calcutt & Carrington (No. 3) [2024] EWHC 2169 (KB).
3. A history of successful claims or favourable settlements did not prevent a restraint order where the claimant had also persisted in totally without merit litigation. The order serves both the administration of justice and respondents, while preserving a route by which meritorious claims may proceed.
4. Access to justice is protected by the common law and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A permission requirement for further claims or applications is an important, time-limited filter rather than an absolute bar.
5. The fee required on an application for permission under paragraph 19 of Schedule 2 to the Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008 creates a cashflow disadvantage and a risk of unrecoverable expense. In the circumstances, the modest fee was a legitimate, necessary, proportionate and justified control. There was no evidence that payment denied access to justice. The court relied on Achille at [19]-[26] in reaching that conclusion.
6. A limited order would control only conduct in the present claim, which had been struck out. An extended order would not be sufficient or appropriate because the failed applications concerned diverse claims against different defendants. A general order was therefore proportionate.

First-instance application to set aside a general civil restraint order made by the same court. The order had followed the dismissal of interim-relief applications in the earlier judgment dated 16 December 2024, [2024] EWHC 3241 (KB).