Bedford Park Developments v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities & Anor

In a planning appeal, an inspector may depart from matters recorded in a statement of common ground where those matters concern evaluative judgment and were identified as issues for determination. Procedural fairness requires a party to know the case it must meet and have a reasonable opportunity to respond, but it does not require the inspector to disclose evolving views during the hearing.

A previous appeal decision is a material consideration, but similar cases need not produce identical outcomes. The inspector must exercise independent planning judgment and explain any materially different conclusion. A decision letter is read flexibly and need only give intelligible and adequate reasons. Planning obligations must satisfy the three tests in regulation 122(2) of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010.

The claimant applied for outline permission for up to 68 dwellings on land near Ringmer, approximately 0.5 kilometres from the South Downs National Park. Lewes District Council refused permission because of landscape and visual harm. Following a hearing, a planning inspector dismissed the appeal on the basis that the development would harm the character and appearance of the countryside and the setting of the National Park, and that adverse impacts outweighed the benefits under paragraph 11(d) of the National Planning Policy Framework.

A nearby appeal, the Croudace Decision, had recently permitted up to 100 dwellings. The claimant challenged the decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, alleging procedural unfairness, inconsistent decision-making, irrationality and inadequate reasons.

1. Claim dismissed. The inspector had not departed from the statement of common ground. The agreed landscape matters were principally factual, while the weight to be given to policies, the nature and extent of harm, and the impact on the National Park and surrounding countryside were expressly identified as matters of disagreement. Those issues were therefore open for determination.
2. There was no procedural unfairness. The effects on the National Park, heritage, coalescence and the Croudace Decision were live issues at the hearing. The claimant had a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and submissions. The inspector was not required to disclose her developing views or provide regular updates during the hearing. In any event, substantial prejudice was not established.
3. The inspector had properly taken the Croudace Decision into account. A previous appeal decision is capable of being a material consideration, but like cases need not be decided alike. The inspector had to exercise her own judgment and give reasons for a materially different conclusion. The Croudace Inspector had considered the effects of one scheme; the inspector here was entitled to consider the cumulative effect of that scheme with the proposed development, including the resulting loss of the green gap between Ringmer and Broyle Side.
4. The inspector had not treated reserved-matters details as fixed. She identified uncertainties about screening, vegetation loss and future garden management, while recognising that matters could be addressed at reserved matters stage. Her assessment of character and appearance was a legitimate exercise of planning judgment.
5. The proposed community woodland did not satisfy regulation 122(2) of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010. It was not shown to be directly related to the development and was therefore given very limited weight. The inspector’s conclusion was rational and adequately reasoned.
6. The inspector correctly applied the tilted balance in paragraph 11(d) of the National Planning Policy Framework. The decision letter intelligibly explained the significant landscape harm, the heritage impacts, the benefits and the conclusion that adverse impacts significantly and demonstrably outweighed the benefits. Grounds 1 to 4 failed.

The claimant appealed the refusal of planning permission under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. A planning inspector dismissed that appeal by decision letter dated 6 February 2023. The statutory review claim under section 288 of the Act was dismissed by the High Court.