Director General of the Independent Office for Police Conduct, R (on the application of) v Police Misconduct Panel

A misconduct panel must give reasons that show how it assessed culpability, harm, aggravating and mitigating factors, reached an overall conclusion on seriousness, and selected the sanction that best fulfils the purposes of the misconduct regime. A reference to those factors without evaluative reasoning is insufficient. Guidance identifying categories of misconduct as “especially serious” does not create a presumption that dismissal is required. The assessment remains fact-sensitive and multi-factorial. Judicial review does not permit the court to substitute its own sanction merely because it considers a more severe sanction preferable. The court must respect the panel’s broad area of judgment unless the decision falls outside the range of rational outcomes.

The IOPC sought judicial review of a misconduct panel’s decision concerning a detective constable. The panel found proven allegations involving misuse of a warrant card and racist language, found gross misconduct, and imposed a two-year final written warning.

The IOPC argued that the sanction was irrational, that the panel had failed to follow the College of Policing’s Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings, and that immediate dismissal was the only rational sanction. It also sought substitution of the court’s decision under Senior Courts Act 1981, section 31(5)(b).

The central issues were whether the panel gave adequate reasons, whether dismissal was the only rational outcome, and whether the court should substitute its own decision or remit the matter.

1. Claim succeeded in part. The sanction decision was unlawful because the panel failed to give adequate reasons. The matter was remitted to the panel for a fresh decision on sanction. No order as to costs was made.
2. The applicable standard was the familiar public-law requirement that reasons must enable the parties and reviewing court to understand why the decision was reached, identify the conclusions on the principal controversial issues, and discern whether legal error occurred. The panel was not required to use a prescribed structure, but it had to demonstrate substantive engagement with the relevant issues.
3. The panel had regard to the College of Policing’s Guidance. It referred to the purposes of the misconduct regime and to culpability, harm, aggravating and mitigating factors. However, it merely listed those matters. It did not explain how they were evaluated, what level of culpability, harm or seriousness was found, how the two allegations interacted, or why the lowest available sanction fulfilled the purposes of the regime.
4. The Guidance did not establish a presumption that dismissal must follow misconduct falling within an “especially serious” category. The assessment remained fact-sensitive. The use of racist language was always serious, but its effect on public confidence and the appropriate sanction depended on the circumstances of the particular case.
5. The court rejected the argument that immediate dismissal was the only rational outcome. A misconduct panel has a broad area of discretionary judgment, particularly because it hears the evidence and possesses relevant institutional expertise. The court could not substitute its own assessment for that of the panel.
6. The power to substitute a decision under section 31(5A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 would arise only if the decision-maker were a court or tribunal and, without the error of law, only one decision could have been reached. The court held that only dismissal was not inevitable, both at the time of the original decision and on any remittal.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Permission was granted by James Strachan KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 15 April 2024. The Administrative Court quashed the sanction decision and remitted the matter to the misconduct panel for a fresh decision.