Dr Imad Naasani, R (on the application of) & Ors v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs

General sanctions regulations may lawfully interfere with Convention rights where they are accessible, pursue sufficiently important legitimate aims, are rationally connected to those aims and strike a proportionate balance.

In reviewing a general measure, the court decides compatibility as a matter of substance but gives special weight to the executive’s assessment where foreign policy and institutional expertise are engaged. The court assesses the measure as a whole, rather than asking whether it achieves its objective in an individual claimant’s case.

The absence of evidence that every possible effect was considered before the measure was made does not determine proportionality. The court may consider subsequent evidence and assessments, provided they reflect conscientious and good-faith consideration.

The claimants sought statutory review under section 38(2) of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 of provisions in the Syria Sanctions (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. They alleged that the Regulations interfered with their Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 rights by making remittances and correspondence between the United Kingdom and Syria difficult.

Fordham J granted permission only for the narrow remittances and correspondence grounds: [2023] EWHC 2853 (Admin). The claimants also advanced late arguments concerning positive obligations, discrimination and postal services. The central issues were whether the Regulations caused the alleged interferences and, if so, whether those interferences were lawful and proportionate.

1. Remittances. The statutory review and surviving judicial-review grounds were dismissed. The Syria Regulations did not impose a total prohibition on remittances. They restricted dealings with designated persons and Syrian financial institutions, while other practical obstacles included foreign sanctions, reputational concerns and financial-institution compliance practices.
2. The Regulations were accessible and sufficiently clear. Their purposes included foreign-policy objectives, protection of civilians and promotion of human rights. Those purposes were capable of constituting legitimate aims, and the financial restrictions were rationally connected with constraining the Syrian regime’s access to resources.
3. In assessing proportionality, the court applied the structured approach identified in Dalston Projects Ltd. The court examined the importance of the objectives, rational connection, less intrusive measures and overall balance. It gave special weight to the Secretary of State’s assessment because the Regulations were general foreign-policy measures within the Secretary of State’s institutional competence.
4. The suggested alternatives, including a general licence or exemption for low-value payments, were not shown likely to improve remittances appreciably without reducing the effectiveness of the sanctions package. The interference was significant but limited, temporary and subject to licensing mechanisms. The contribution of the Regulations to their objectives outweighed their effects on the claimants’ rights.
5. Correspondence. The evidence did not establish that the Regulations caused the suspension of postal services. The Regulations contained no general restriction on postal correspondence, and the evidence attributed the suspension principally to the political and operational situation in Syria. The challenge therefore failed on causation.
6. Even if the Regulations had materially interfered with postal correspondence, the interference would have been justified. The trade and aviation restrictions were rationally connected with preventing sanctions evasion and restricting support for the Syrian regime. Alternative means of communication remained available, and the alleged interference concerned, at most, a non-core aspect of correspondence.
7. The late arguments based on a positive obligation to secure postal services and Article 14 were outside the scope of the statutory review and were in any event directed to matters involving authorities not before the court. Parliament could authorise delegated legislation creating criminal offences; section 17 of the 2018 Act did so here.
8. The application for statutory review and the stayed judicial-review application were dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused. The claimants were ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs, summarily assessed at £40,000.

1. High Court (Administrative Court) — The statutory review application under section 38(2) of the 2018 Act and the stayed judicial-review application were dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused.
2. Permission stage — Fordham J refused permission on the wider challenges and permitted only the remittances and correspondence grounds to proceed: [2023] EWHC 2853 (Admin).